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Recent research  shows that  new ventures  have  great difficulties  in  defining  a viable  business 
model  from  the  outset  and  that  minor  or  major  adaptations  to  this  initial  business  model  are 
needed  as  the  venture  evolves.  Entrepreneurial  adaptation  or  the  entrepreneur's  willingness 
and  ability  to  make  appropriate  adjustments  to  the  business  concept  become  critical.  If 
adaptation  is  so  important for entrepreneurial  companies,  we  need  to  ask ourselves a number 
of  questions.  (1)  What  causes  this  need  for  adaptation?  (2a)  What  is  the  precise  effect  of 
adaptation on a start-up's performance or survival and (2b) is this effect similar for all start-ups? 
Also,  (3)  what do we  know about the process of adaptation? And  (4)  what are factors enabling 
this adaptation process?  Finally, we  also need to determine  (5)  how the concept of adaptation 
in  entrepreneurial  companies  is  related  to  existing  concepts  of change  and  adaptation.  The 
purpose of this  paper  is to  give  an  overview of different literature streams that are specifically 
relevant to  entrepreneurial  adaptation  and  the  questions listed above,  and to  point out gaps  in 
the  existing  literature  requiring  further  investigation.  We  look at whether  and  how the  existing 
literature  can  provide  insight into  each  of those  five  questions.  In  a final  section,  we  point out 
directions for further research. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In  recent  years,  researchers  in  entrepreneurship  and  economics  have  moved  away  from 
research on  personality traits towards and  have recognized the  need to focus on the discovery 
and  exploitation  of  opportunity  (Shane  and  Venkataraman,  2000;  Acs  and  Audretsch,  2003) 
and  on  entrepreneurial choice  models  (Evans  and  Jovanovic,  2002).  Venkataraman  (1997,  p. 
121) suggests that one of the most pertinent questions in the field of entrepreneurship research 
is  "why,  when  and how some  [entrepreneurial  companies} are  able  to  discover and exploit 
opportunities while others cannot or do not. " 
Various  authors  have  put  forward  that  it  is  not  the  clairvoyance  of  the  entrepreneur  or 
intrapreneur  that  determines  this  ability.  There  exist  evidence  that  most  initial  selections  of 
business  models  by  new  ventures  have  to  be  abandoned  later  on  and  that  minor  or  major 
adaptations to the initial business model are needed. 
New businesses often  start from  a vision  or from  a technological capability.  In  both  cases,  the 
initial  idea  needs  to  be  translated  into  economic  benefits  through  the  development  of  a 
business model  (Chesbrough  and  Rosenbloom,  2002).  The business model  is then considered 
a construct  that  mediates  the  value  creation  process,  by  selecting  and  filtering  technologies 
and  ideas,  and  packaging  them  into  particular configurations  to  be  offered  to  a chosen  target 
market.  The  functions  of a business  model  are  "to  articulate  the  value  proposition,  identify  a 
market segment  define the  structure  of the  value chain,  estimate the cost structure and  profit 
potential,  describe the  position  of the  firm  within  the  value  network,  formulate  the  competitive 
strategy" (Chesbrough and  Rosenbloom,  2002:  p.  533-534). 
Pitt  and  Kannemeyer  (2000)  question  whether  many  entrepreneurs  are  able  to  define  the 
business  model  correctly  from  the  outset.  To  paraphrase  Stoica  and  Schindehutte  (1999:  p. 
1): "Entrepreneurs  start  with  a  vision.  ...  When  successful  it  is  because  they  are  able  to 
translate this  vision into a business concept that addresses a marketplace need.  ...  only in a 
minority of  cases do  entrepreneurs succeed because  they define their concept correctly from 
the  beginning,  and  rarely  do  they  immediately  achieve  a good  fit  between  the  available 
opportunity and their approach to  the business concept." Or  as  Peter  Drucker  (1985:  p.  189) 
has noted" When a new venture does succeed,  more often than not it is in a market other than 
2 the  one  it  was  originally intended  to  serve,  with  products and services not quite  those  with 
which it had set out,  bought in large part by customers it did not even think of when it started. 
and used for a host of  purposes besides the ones for which the products were first designed.  m 
Existing  research  data  confirms  this.  Brokaw  (1991),  in  her  update  of  the  twenty  seven 
ventures that were profiled  in  Inc.'s "Anatomy of a Start-up" series between the period of 1988 
and 1990, found that by 1991, a large fraction of the surviving ventures had adapted their initial 
business  model: "What has made or broken many of the companies we've  watched. .  .is  ...  the 
ability (or inability) to recognize and react to the completely unpredictable  ...  To be flexible,  and 
not just in response to small surprises but to really big ones- ftke  discovering you're selling to 
the  wrong  customers or selling through  entirely wrong  channels.  Some companies  even find 
they have to revamp from top to bottom in order to survive.  They discover they're in the wrong 
business" (Brokaw, 1991: p.  54). 
In  the  context  of  new  venture  development,  adaptation  thus  refers  to  the  entrepreneur's 
willingness  and  ability  to  make  appropriate  adjustments  to  the  business  concept  and 
marketing approach as the venture evolves from an initial idea or business plan through 
the early  stages  of the organizational  life-cycle  (Morris  et  aI.,  1999;  Pitt and  Kannemeyer, 
2000). 
If adaptation is so important for entrepreneurial companies, we need to ask ourselves a number 
of  questions.  (1)  What  causes  this  need  for  adaptation?  (2a)  What  is  the  precise  effect  of 
adaptation on a start-up's performance or survival and (2b)  is this effect similar for all start-ups? 
Also,  (3) what do we  know about the process of adaptation?  And  (4)  what are factors enabling 
this adaptation process? 
We must note that the concept of adaptation described above  is different from the one used  in 
literature  on  established  companies  (see  for  example  the  work  of  T  uominen  et  aI.,  2002; 
Oktemgil  and  Greenley,  1997;  Hrebiniak  and  Joyce,  1985,  Van  de  Ven  and  Poole,  1995, 
Jankowicz,  2000,  Burgelman,  1991).  The  latter  regards  adaptation  as  an  organization's 
response to changes in external factors, threats and opportunities. Organizational adaptation or 
change  is  then  defined  as  "change  in  a significant  organizational  attribute,  such  as  basic 
business strategy or organizational structure in response to environmental changes ... "  (Kraatz, 
1998). 
3 While  Kraatz'  definition  of adaptation  suggests  that  companies  need  to  adapt  to  changes  in 
their  environment,  the  entrepreneurial  adaptation  on  which  this  paper  focuses  is  needed 
regardless  of environmental  change.  It  is about entrepreneurs  and  ventures who  need  to  find 
their place  in  the  environment.  or  even  about them  finding  the  most appropriate  environment. 
Consequently,  we  cannot  readily  answer  the  questions  above  by  applying  insights  on 
adaptation  in  established  firms  to  entrepreneurial  companies.  We  therefore  also  need  to  ask 
ourselves (5)  how the concept of adaptation  in  entrepreneurial companies  is related  to existing 
concepts of change and adaptation. 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  give  an  overview  of  different  literature  streams  specifically 
relevant to entrepreneurial  adaptation  and  the  questions listed  above,  and to  point out gaps  in 
the  existing  literature  that  need  further  investigation.  In  the  following  sections  we  look  at 
whether and  how existing literature can  answer each of these five questions.  In a final section, 
we point out directions for further research. 
WHAT CAUSES THE NEED FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL ADAPTATION? 
Mortality  rates  among  new ventures  are  known  to  be  high.  About 40%  of them fail  in  the  first 
year of their existence. About 50% of them fail  in the first three years. About 60% of them fail  in 
the first six years,  about 70%  in  the first  eight years,  and  about 90%  during the  first ten years 
(see,  amongst  others:  Timmons,  1994;  Smilor  and  Gill,  1986;  Bruno  et  aI.,  1992:  EC,  1993; 
Cooper  et  aI.,  1994;  Bhide,  2000).  In  addition,  many  'surviving'  firms  attain  only  'marginal 
survival.'  This  phenomenon  of firm  failure  and  marginal  survival  explains  why the  tails of firm 
size distributions are so long, populated as they are with a multitude of small firms continuously 
entering an industry while failing to grow and to prosper in the longer run. 
Liabilities 
The  high  mortality  risk  new  ventures  are  facing  is  often  seen  as  a consequence  of various 
types of liabilities they are confronted with from their conception onwards  (see for example  Mc 
4 Cartan-Quinn  and  Carson,  2003).  In  general,  we  can  discern  between  three  types  of  liability: 
liability of smallness, of newness, and of foreignness. 
The  liability  of  smallness  hypothesis  points  to  the  relationship  between  size  and  mortality. 
The  theoretic  rationale  behind  this  hypothesis  dates  back  to  Hannan  and  Freeman's  original 
paper  on  population  ecology  (1977),  in  which  they  state that 'the  appropriate  time  scale  for a 
selection  process increases with the  size of the organizations  under consideration'.  Population 
ecologists  have  given  two  main  reasons  for  this  liability  of  smallness  phenomenon.  A first 
explanation  is given  in  Singh  and  Lumsden's  review  (1990:176): "the level of structural inertia 
increases  with  size .... since selection processes  in  modern societies are such  that they favor 
organizations  with greater structural inertia  (i.e.  inert organizations have lower mortality rates) 
larger organizations must have lower mortality rates  ... '" 
Barron  et  al  (1994:388)  analyze  the  liability  of  smallness  hypothesis  from  a slightly  different 
point of view: "large organizations can retrench by reducing their scale of operations over long 
periods of  poor performance before they are forced to disband.  Small organizations have little 
room to contract, and they fail quickly once fortunes decline ... '" 
Other  explanations  focus  on  the  fact that  large  organizations  have  more  'slack resources'  on 
which they can  rely during periods of environmental change (Haveman, 1993). Slack resources 
facilitate  experimentation  with  new  strategies  and  products  and  facilitate  entrance  in  new 
markets  because  it buffers organizations from  downside risks.  Not only do small,  independent 
ventures dispose of limited financial resources  (see for example Berry & Taggart.  1998; Bhide, 
1992,1994,1996; Hite & Hesterly,  2001).  According to Wyer and  Smallbone  (1999),  a lack of 
finance  may  hinder  the  management  process  of  small  companies  at  the  level  of  business 
strategy as well  as on the level of operational strategy.  In  addition,  small companies also often 
lack  the  human  capabilities  that  are  needed  to  commercialize  technological  innovations 
(Steensma  et  aI.,  2000,  see  also  Baum  et  aI.,  2000).  The  founders  of  technology-based 
ventures  usually  represent  a limited  range  of technological  competences,  and  market  as  well 
as  managerial  knowledge.  Wyer  and  Smallbone  (1999)  also  point  to  a  possible  lack  in 
management time and to the fact that these firms are too small to employ internal specialists.  In 
addition,  external  consultants  are  often  unaware  and  insensitive  to  the  needs  of  small 
companies.  Also,  many  classical  management  concepts  are  unsuitable  for  application  in  a 
small firm context (Mc Cartan-Quinn and Carson, 2003). 
5 Most of the  early  empirical  studies  support the  'liability of smallness  hypothesis'  (i.e.  negative 
monotonic  effect  of  size  on  mortality  rates),  which  has  become  conventional  wisdom  in 
organizational  theory.  The  liability  of  smallness  hypothesis  was  also  consistent  with  a long 
tradition of empirical economic studies on the size distribution of firms. This stream of research, 
which  was  initiated  by  Simon  and  Bonini's  seminal  article  (Simon  and  Bonini,  1958),  had 
traditionally  found  that  in  most  industries  the  distribution  is  lognormal.  Although  most 
economists relied on Gibrat's law of proportionate growth to explain this kind of distribution, the 
lognormal distribution  is  also the result if the  liability of smallness  hypothesis receives support. 
F  or  example,  small  organizations  might  face  consistently  more  problems  than  large 
organizations, which increases their mortality rates. 
Complementary to this liability of smallness, liability of newness is often  identified as a major 
cause  of  mortality  (Shepherd  et  aI.,  2000;  for  an  overview  see  Eisenhardt  & Schoonhoven, 
1990). The  theoretical  explanation  goes  back to  Stinchcombe's  (1965)  observations that  new 
organizations  have  higher  failure  rates  than  older  ones,  which  is  known  as  the  'liability  of 
newness'. 
Hannan  and  Freeman  (1984)  have  subsequently  made  the  same  observation,  which  they 
explained  by  an  evolutionary  argument:  They  argued  that  in  modern  societies  organizations 
with  high  levels  of  'reliability'  and  'accountability'  are  favored  by  selection  processes.  New 
ventures lack a 'track record' with customers and suppliers (see also  Hay et aI.,  1993), and the 
employees and founders of these ventures are not always able to quickly take on the new roles 
and  relationships  that  are  required.  Business  relationships  with  stakeholders  need  to  be  built, 
legitimacy  and  reputation  need  to  be  established,  new  employees  must  be  recruited  and 
trained  (Lu  & Beamish,  2001;  Hite & Hesterly,  2001).  Shepherd  et al.  (2000)  suggest that this 
newness  or  novelty  consists  of  novelty  to  market,  novelty  in  production,  and  novelty  to 
management.  Hay  et  al.  (1993)  point  to  the  existence  of  an  'asset  accumulation  gap'  that 
ventures  must  close  in  order  to  satisfy  early  customers  and  outperform  established  rivals. 
Although these early customers may initially be attracted  by benefits from  new technology, they 
will  not  continue  to  tolerate  the  ventures  deficiencies  with  respect  to  distribution,  unproven 
service  capability,  supply  shortages,  or quality failures.  Also  Zahra  et  al.  (2000)  suggest that, 
even  when  offering  a superior  technology  or  product,  ventures  must  learn  new  skills  and 
competencies  in  order  to  position  their  products  successfully  and  to  survive.  Singh  and 
6 Lumsden summarized (1990:168): "Reliability and accountability of organizational forms require 
that  the  organizational structure  be  highly  reproducible.  Due  both  to  processes  of internal 
learning,  coordination,  and socialization within the organization and to external legitimation and 
development of webs of exchange,  the reproducibility of organization structure increases  with 
age.  Because  greater  reproducibility  of structure  also  leads  to  greater  inertia,  however, 
organizations  become  increasingly  inert  with  age.  And  since  selection  processes  favor 
organizations  with  inert  structures,  organizational  mortality  rates  decrease  with  age  -- the 
liability of newness  .... '" 
Related to these liabilities of newness and smallness is the lack of coordination mechanisms 
in  small,  new  companies,  as  explained  by  Bhide  (2000).  Unlike  large  established  firms, 
ventures  do  not  have  a  broad  portfolio  of  (tangible  and  intangible)  assets  nor  effective 
mechanisms for coordinating these assets.  Building a firm requires the entrepreneur to develop 
assets  and  coordination  mechanisms from  scratch.  It  is  only  as  firms  develop  more  extensive 
coordination capabilities that they tend to undertake activities where the returns from managing 
complexity can justify the increased administrative costs. 
If  in  addition,  a company  enters  new  target  markets  dissimilar  to  its  original  markets,  it  is 
confronted  with  liabilities of foreignness  (Hymer,  1976). This means that the knowledge and 
capabilities  a venture  has  acquired  by  operating  in  its  initial  markets  are  not  suitable  for 
targeting  these  new  markets.  This  inappropriateness  arises  from  differences  between  home 
and foreign markets with respect to  political,  economic, cultural,  and  legal characteristics  (Lu & 
Beamish,2001). 
The liabilities of smallness,  newness, and foreignness as discussed above,  all  refer to a lack of 
resources, capabilities or knowledge within the venture.  The characteristics of the venture itself 
cause  problems  for  the  development  of  technologies,  products  and  markets.  These 
characteristics may limit its ability to select and implement its strategies  (Wyer and  Small bone, 
1999).  A commonly  proposed  solution  is  then  to  acquire  these  resources,  capabilities,  and 
knowledge through  learning  and experimenting.  Shepherd  et al.  (2000),  in their study of risk 
reduction  in  ventures,  discern  between  evolutionary  and  procedural  risk  reduction.  From  an 
evolutionary viewpoint  mortality risk  declines over time  as  liability is reduced through  'passive 
learning'. However, from a procedural point of view, ventures can engage  in 'active learning' by 
taking deliberate strategic decisions leading to liability reduction.  Networking and partnering are 
7 often  put forward  as  interesting  strategies  in  this  respect  (Shepherd  et aI.,  2000;  Foray,  1991; 
Teubal  et aI.,  1991; Baum  et aI.,  2000). Active and  intelligent experimentation  is put forward  by 
innovation  literature  as  a valuable  tool  for  information  exchange  and  learning  in  situations 
characterized  by high  levels of ambiguity (Loch  et aI.,  2001; Thomke,  2003;  March,  1978;  Loch 
and T  erwiesch,  1998). 
Uncertainty and ambiguity 
However,  not only the characteristics of the venture itself can  cause  problems.  Characteristics 
of  technologies,  products  and  markets,  and  more  specifically  uncertainty  and  ambiguity 
regarding their viability pose major threats to new ventures' survival.  The future profitability of a 
business  opportunity  is  impossible  to  determine  beforehand  (Saemundsson  and  Linholm 
Dahlstrand,  forthcoming).  Although  the  entrepreneur  functions  in  the  economic  environment 
only if the environment is uncertain (Gifford, 2003), uncertainty and ambiguity form the major 
obstacle  in  ventures'  search  for  viable  business  models  (see  also  Morris  et  aI.,  1999;  Shane 
and  Stuart,  2002;  Aldrich  and  Fio!,  1994),  especially  in  the  case  of  new  technology-based 
ventures  that  are  coping  with  high  degrees  of both  technical  and  market  newness  (Garnsey, 
1995). Nohria (1992) points out that in the creation of new ventures, different elements must be 
combined,  taken  apart  and  recombined  (see  also  Baker  and  Faulkner,  1991)  and  that 
"successfully  putting  these  puzzles  together  is  no  easy  matter;  given  the  { .  .] uncertainty 
inherent in the creation of  a new enterprise" (Nohria, 1992: 243). 
Uncertainty  can  be  defined  as  characteristic  of  a situation  in  which  the  problem  solver 
understands the  structure of the  problem  (including the  set of relevant  decision variables),  but 
is dissatisfied with the  knowledge available  on the value  of these decision variables  (Schrader 
et aI., 1993). Ambiguity is then defined as lack of clarity regarding the relationships between the 
variables  and  the  problem  solving  algorithm  and  sometimes  even  about  the  set  of  relevant 
decision  variables  itself.  Ambiguity  relates  directly  to  Daft  and  Lengel's  notion  (1986)  of 
equivocality,  which  they  define  as  "ambiguity,  the  existence  of multiple  and  conflicting 
interpretations about a situation. " 
Because  both  technical  and  market  uncertainty  are  involved  in  this translation  and  because 
environments  may change  rapidly, the set of all feasible business models is not foreseeable  in 
8 advance  (see  also the  work of  Druilhe  and  Garnsey,  2002  and  2004  on  university spin-outs). 
Certainly during the early stages  in its life, a new business unit is confronted with  high degrees 
of  both  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  while  confronted  with  a  limited  knowledge  base  and 
experiencing  restricted  access  to  resources  (see  for  example:  Bhide,  2000).  Not  only  is  the 
nature  and  the  outcome  of their technical  activities  inherently  unpredictable  (Steensma  et  aI., 
2000),  but  also  the  market  selection  and  commercialization  process  itself poses  problems  of 
uncertainty  and  ambiguity  (Chesbrough,  2003;  Chesbrough  and  Rosenbloom,  2002; 
Chesbrough,  2002).  Utterback  (1987)  distinguishes  between  technical  and  target  uncertainty. 
When  initially  developing  a business  model,  the  business  unit  is  confronted  with  uncertain 
innovation  targets,  unclear product performance  requirements,  unclear  demand  functions  and 
ambiguous  design  criteria.  Innovations are  by  definition only successful when they  succeed  in 
coupling  a technological  capability  to  a user  need  (Teubal  et  aI.,  1991).  During  this  process, 
innovations  face  considerable  selection  pressures  on  their  way  to  commercialization  (Nelson 
and  Winter,  1982).  Venkataraman  (1997)  proposes  that  entrepreneurial  opportunities  are 
opportunities to  bring  into  existence markets for goods and services that do  not yet exist.  New 
markets  are  often  created  by  the  users  of  the  goods  or  services  produced  by  the  innovator 
(Von  Hippel,  1998),  some of whom  adopt innovations more quickly then others  (Rogers,  2000; 
Moore, 1995, 1999). 
The  range  of options  - and  problems  - that  founders  of  new  business  units  confront  is  vast. 
Entrepreneurs and  intrapreneurs must continuously ask what application they want to strive for 
and  what  competencies  they  need  to  develop  in  order  to  accomplish  that  prowess  (Bhide, 
1996).  In  emergent  markets,  technological  options  are  at  best  marginally  understood, 
distribution  channels  and  sources  of  supply  are  problematic,  market  needs  are  not  clearly 
defined,  and  hence,  market viability cannot  be  proven  a priori  (see  Abernathy  and  Utterback, 
1975 & 1978; Debackere,  1997;  Eisenhardt and  Schoonhoven,  1990;  Bhide,  1992,  1994, 1996 
& 2000;  Teubal  et aI.,  1991). There  is some evidence that uncertainty with  respect to  markets 
has  an  even  larger  effect  on  the  development of opportunities  than  technological  uncertainty 
(Eisenhardt  and  Schoonhoven,  1990;  Autio  and  Lumme,  1989;  Saemundsson  and  Lindholm 
Dahlstrand, forthcoming). 
As  a logical  consequence,  it  is  not  possible  for  a venture  to  identify  upfront  what  will  be  the 
most viable  business  model.  Uncertainty  and  risk  occasions  many  needs to  change  (Pitt  and 
Kannemeyer,  2000).  In  general,  high  levels  of  uncertainty  are  known  to  require  adaptive 
9 approaches  to  organizations  (Timmons  et  aI.,  1990).  Market  signals  may  reveal  information 
about the  external  environment that was  unknown  and  or uncertain  at the outset  indicating  a 
possible  need  to  change  or adapt the  initial  business  model  (Stoica  and  Schindehutte,  1999). 
As  Stoica  and  Schindehutte  (1999)  put  it:  "The  adaptive  entrepreneur  allows  the  business 
concept to  develop  over time  as he/she gains  experience  with products,  markets,  suppliers, 
employees,  and  other key  variables  surrounding  the  enterprise" (Stoica  and  Schindehutte, 
1999:  p.  1-2).  In  the  context  of  new  venture  development  adaptation  thus  refers  to  the 
entrepreneur's willingness and  ability to  make appropriate adjustments to the business concept 
and  marketing  approach  as  the  venture  evolves  from  an  initial  idea  or  business  plan  through 
the  early  stages  of  the  organizational  life-cycle  (Morris  et  aI.,  1999;  Pitt  and  Kannemeyer, 
2000). 
Conclusion 
According  to  the  existing  literature, the  need  for entrepreneurial  adaptation originates from  the 
presence of uncertainty and  ambiguity  both  on the technical  and  on the  market side.  Certainly 
during  the  early  stages  in  its  life,  new  business  units  are  confronted  with  high  degrees  of 
uncertainty  and  ambiguity with  respect to technology  and  market  potential.  At the  same  time, 
they are confronted with liabilities of newness, smallness and foreignness which hinder them to 
cope with problems, including the ways in which they should handle uncertainty and ambiguity. 
The  standard  approach to  deal with  uncertainty and  ambiguity often  is through  trial  and  error, 
experimentation and learning. Hence it is about adaptation, adapting, and adaptability. 
WHAT IS THE PRECISE EFFECT OF ADAPTATION ON PERFORMANCE? 
Although  the  importance  of  adaptation  for  new  ventures  is  widely  accepted,  relatively  little 
research  has  been  done  to  investigate  the  precise  effect  of  the  initial  business  model's 
adaptation  on  the survival of new  business units and to  investigate the factors  moderating this 
relationship. 
10 Effect of  adaptation 
Literature  on  established  firms  points  to  the  danger  of  not  only  'under-adaptation',  but  also 
'over-adaptation'.  Snow  and  Hrebiniak  (1980)  find  that  mean  performance  (measured  as 
income  divided  by  assets)  is  the  highest  for  moderately  adaptive  firms.  McGee  et  al.  (1989) 
replicate  this  result  with  performance  measured  as  return  on  assets.  As  explained  by  Stoica 
and  Schindehutte  (1999,  p.7)  "under-adaptation  can  lead  to  unintended  costs  (especially 
inventory),  low  customers,  and  missed  opportunities.  Over-adaptation  utilizes  resources 
unnecessarily,  may find the firm under-emphasizing its core business,  and frequently finds the 
firm pursuing courses of  action that do not generate requisite payoffs. "'This negative effect of 
adaptation  appears to  be  more  pronounced  depending  on  the type of adaptation.  Cottrell  and 
Nault  (2004)  find  - for  a sample  of  microcomputer  software  companies  - that  changes  in 
product  variety  through  new  product  introductions  improve  firm  performance,  whereas 
extensions  to  existing  products  hinder  firm  and  product  performance.  Also,  products  that 
encapsulate  more  application  categories  perform  better,  while  products  that  cover  more 
computing platforms perform worse. 
Stoica  and  Schindehutte  (1999)  propose  that  the  danger  of  over-adaptation  is  especially 
present in the context of entrepreneurial business  units.  They point out that entrepreneurs are 
opportunists,  but  that  resource  constraints  limit  the  thorough  analysis  of  these  new 
opportunities.  It  is  thus  not  unlikely  that  they  will  spread  out  their  resources  too  thin  over 
various opportunities,  reducing the  possibility to  succeed  in  any of them.  Their research  study 
indeed  finds  a curvilinear  relationship  between  adaptation  and  performance.  However,  their 
sample - where the typical firm  has  been  in  business  between  5 and  25 years,  and  has fewer 
than 100 employees - does not appear representative of entrepreneurial start -ups. 
So,  a certain  degree of adaptation appears  important for the  performance and survival of new 
businesses  due  to  the  inherent  presence  of  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  in  new  business 
development.  However,  new  studies  should  verify  whether  too  much  adaptation  can  be 
detrimental in this context. 
11 Moderatinq factors 
As  indicated  above,  the  need  for  adaptation  can  be  attributed  to  the  presence  of  uncertainty 
and ambiguity aggravating the  effects of liabilities. As a consequence, the relationship between 
entrepreneurial  adaptation  and  performance  is  expected to  be  moderated  by characteristics of 
the organization  (more precisely:  liabilities)  and of its environment (contributing to the presence 
of environmental uncertainty and ambiguity). 
Company characteristics 
The need for adaptation  may for example be dependent on the origin of the start-up and  on the 
former  experience  of  the  founder.  Based  on  the  origin  of  the  start-up,  one  can  discern 
between  different types  of new  businesses.  Shane  and  Eckhardt  (2003)  identify four types  of 
entrepreneurial  efforts  as  a function  of the  locus of discovery  and  exploitation,  depending  on 
whether the entrepreneur is an  independent individual or a member of an existing organization. 
Their approach  leads to  the following  typology:  (1)  Independent Start-ups  (both  discovery and 
exploitation are done by independent individuals),  (2)  Spin-offs (discovery is done by a member 
of  an  existing  organization,  but  exploitation  is  done  by  an  independent  individual),  (3) 
Acquisition  (discovery  is  done  by  an  independent  individual,  but  exploitation  is  done  by  an 
existing  organization),  and  (4)  Corporate  Venturing  (both  discovery  and  exploitation  are  done 
by  members  of existing  organizations).  Given  our interest  in  how  new  businesses  succeed  in 
developing a viable business model,  we  limit our discussion to independent start-ups and spin-
offs.  We can  further distinguish  between academic and  non-academic spin-offs,  depending on 
whether the discovery takes  place  at a university (or other research  institute)  or in  a business 
organization. The origin of a new business can be expected to affect its need for adaptation. 
Academic  spin-offs  for  example  may  in  some  cases  start  purely  from  specific  technology, 
without  having  much  complementary  knowledge.  Non-academic  ventures,  on  the  other  hand, 
can  be  expected  to  have  a better  idea  of  potential  applications  and  markets.  Academic 
ventures may therefore  need to  be  more adaptable to  reach  long-term  survival than  their non-
academic  counterparts.  Also,  research  (see  for  example  Burgelman,  1983;  Bhide,  2000; 
Feeser  and  Willard,  1990;  Chandler,  1996;  Zucker  et  aI.,  2002)  suggests  that  spin-outs  of 
existing companies will  have fewer  problems defining a viable  business model - and  thus  less 
need  for  adaptation  - than  independent  start-ups.  In  his  study  of  the  internal  corporate 
12 venturing  process,  Burgelman  (1983)  shows  how the  initiation of the  project definition  process 
involves technical  linking  as well  as  need  linking  activities.  While the  new product  process,  or 
system is still in the definition process, market interest already needs to be created.  Burgelman 
observes  that  unauthorized  selling  efforts  are  started  even  before  the  project  becomes  an 
official  venture.  This  is  only  possible  because  group  leaders  have  direct  involvement  in 
research  activities  and  sufficient  awareness  of  market  needs.  Bhide  (2000)  shows  how 
employees  of  established  corporations  who  develop  new  initiatives,  can  use  the  cash  flows, 
relationships,  and  reputation  provided  by  existing  businesses.  This  helps  them  to  secure 
customers,  employees  and  other  resources  for  their  start-up.  Feeser  and  Willard  (1990)  and 
Chandler  (1996)  found that similarity between the  activities of the company and  its parent with 
respect to technology and  markets positively affected the  growth of the  company.  Also  Zucker 
et  al.  (2002)  find  that  new  biotech  units  of  established  firms  obtain  more  and  higher-quality 
patents than  new entrants.  Since  patents  need  to  demonstrate  potential  practical  applicability, 
this  can  be  considered  an  indication  that  new  units  of  established  firms  are  better  at 
commercializing technology.  Spin-outs  of established  companies  are  thus  believed  to  be  less 
hindered  by  liabilities  of newness,  smallness  and  foreignness  than  independent start-ups  and 
academic spin-offs. 
Even  if activities spin-out of established firms  and  become completely independent  or even  if 
the  entrepreneur  starts  the  venture  without  any  support  from  his  original  employee,  former 
experience  of the  entrepreneurs  very  often  provides  the  new  venture  with  a relatively  clear 
view  on  potential  applications  and  markets,  thus  reducing  the  need  for  adaptation.  In  many 
cases,  the  venture  becomes  a supplier  or  a competitor  of  the  'mother  organization'.  The 
experience  and  background  of  the  founder(s)  may  reduce  liabilities  and  also 
uncertainty/ambiguity about the viability of the business model, and therefore also the  need for 
adaptation. Christensen and  Raynor (2003)  in this respect refer to the work of McCall (1998).  In 
this  view,  business  units  can  be  thought  of  as  schools  of experience,  and  'the management 
skills and intuition  that enable people  to  succeed in  new assignments  were  shaped through 
their experiences in previous assignments (Christensen and  Raynor,  p.  179). Not the attributes 
of  an  entrepreneur  or  his  past  successes,  but  his  previous  activities  - albeit  successful  or 
unsuccessful - will  determine whether or  not  he  is fit to  perform similar activities in  the context 
of  the  new  venture.  Entrepreneurs  that  have  experience  in  spotting  and  developing 
opportunities in a certain sector will  be able to do the same thing  in a new venture context. 
13 However,  some evidence exists that intrapreneurs need to  be  equally adaptable.  In  one of the 
corporate  ventures  of  Xerox  studied  by  Burgelman  (1983),  the  initial  focus  of the  project  to 
improve  plastics turned  out to  be  on  the  wrong  size of bottles.  Although  a basis  for  corporate 
support had  been demonstrated, adaptation was necessary.  At such  instances, the experience 
of the  intrapreneur may even  act  as a hindrance  by  making  him  or her 'blind' for the  required 
changes  and  adaptations.  Shane  (2002)  shows that prior knowledge enables entrepreneurs to 
discover only a limited set of opportunities. A similar effect of functional background and parent 
organization strategy on  strategic choices is found  by Boeker (2000).  Chesbrough  (2002)  even 
suggests that corporate ventures need to  be even  more adaptable than independent start-ups, 
because  they  need  to  free  themselves  from  the  dominant  business  logic  of  the  parent 
company.  In  his  study  of  35  Xerox  spin-offs,  he  found  that  "those  spin-offs  that  became 
successful did so through evolving business models that came to differ substantially from that 
of  Xerox ... "(Chesbrough, 2002,  p.  529). 
In  his  review  of  different  literature  streams  on  employee  startups  in  high-tech  industries, 
Klepper (2001)  points out that incumbents have serious difficulties in  assessing certain types of 
innovation,  such  as  architectural  innovations  (Henderson  and  Clark,  1990),  competence-
destroying  innovations  (T ushman  and  Anderson,  1986)  and  innovations  that  appeal  to  new 
users  due  to  reliance  on  feedback  from  current  customers  (Christensen,  1993).  Holmstrom 
(2002)  argues that established firms  are focused  on  routine  activities such  as  exerting  control 
over employees  and  satifying current  market expectations,  which  hinders them  to  pursue new 
opportunities.  Abernathy  and  Utterback  in  their seminal  work  (see  for example Abernathy  and 
Utterback,  1975 and  Utterback,  1994) describe how incumbents fail  to cope with  breakthrough 
innovations by placing their bets only half-heartedly on the emerging dominant design, because 
they  are  crushed  under  the  obligations  and  the  momentum  of  their  ongoing  concern.  Also 
Christensen  and  Raynor  (2003)  show that companies face a large number of difficulties when 
trying  to  balance  disruptive  innovations  and  exploitation  of existing  activities.  All  this suggests 
that new business units of established firms will have even greater difficulties than independent 
start-ups  in  defining  the  initial  business  model  and  therefore  will  need  to  be  more  adaptive 
afterwards. 
Sector characteristics 
In addition to the background of the new business unit the characteristics of the sector in which 
it operates  may equally affect the  need for adaptation  of the  initial  business  plan.  Morris et al. 
14 (1999)  suggest  that  ambiguity  and  risk  influence  the  need  for  adaptation  in  entrepreneurial 
companies,  but  they  do  not  investigate  these  effects  empirically.  Other  research  findings 
confirm this suggestion however. 
Firstly, the maturity of the industry sector in which a technology-based venture operates - and 
more  specifically  the  emergence  (or  not yet)  of a dominant  design  (Utterback,  1994)  - may 
influence  the  need  for  adaptation.  The  maturity  of  a sector  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the 
presence of uncertainty/ambiguity in that sector (as suggested by Morris et ai,  1999).  In  mature 
markets, dominant designs, process technologies,  and strategies are clear. New business units 
have  few  difficulties  identifying  the  accepted,  viable  business  model  for  the  industry.  Growth 
markets,  on the other hand,  are viable  but turbulent.  There may  be  multiple options for how to 
compete  within  an  overarching  dominant  design.  And  in  emergent  markets,  the  timing  of 
commercial takeoff and the viability of certain business models are impossible to predict. 
Secondly, the need for a new technology-based venture to adapt its initial business model may 
be  influenced  by the  capital  intensity of the  sector in which  it operates.  Research  has  shown 
that  scale  economies  and  capital  intensity  lower  the  likelihood  of  survival  of  new  firms 
(Audretsch,  D.B.,  1991).  Mean  growth  rates  of  small  firms  decrease  with  their  initial  sizes, 
whereas for  initially large firms,  growth rates and  size  are unrelated  (Caves,  2000).  One would 
logically  reason  that the  need  for  large  investments  (R&D  and  other  types)  hinders  shifts  in 
business  models.  However,  under  these  circumstances,  the  need  for  adaptation  increases, 
since  failure  will  lead  to  greater  losses.  Indeed,  whereas  a  small  financial  loss  will  not 
immediately jeopardize survival,  business units may not be able to overcome the obsolescence 
of large investments. 
As  we  already  noted,  adapting  various  aspects  of the  business  model  may  be  necessary  not 
only  to  find  an  appropriate  place  in  the  environment  or  to  find  the  most  appropriate 
environment;  it is also necessary when  environmental circumstances change  (see for example 
the work of Tuominen  et aI.,  2002;  Oktemgil  and  Greenley,  1997;  Hrebiniak and  Joyce,  1985, 
Van  de  Ven  and  Poole,  1995,  Jankowicz,  2000).  In  the  latter case,  established  companies  as 
well as new business units may need to change course. Of important influence in this respect is 
the  regime  of  technological  opportunity  in  a sector.  Technological  opportunity  'can  be 
regarded  as  the  set  of  production  possibilities  for  translating  research  resources  into  new 
techniques of production' (Cohen  and  Levin,  1989, p.  214).  Klevorick et al.  (2002) identify three 
15 major  sources  of  technological  opportunities:  advances  in  science,  feedback  from  industry 
developments  and  transfer  of  advances  from  other  industries.  This  explains  why  technical 
advance  may  be  higher-paced  in  some  industries  than  in  others  (see  also  Audretsch,  2002). 
The  regime  of  technological  opportunity  influences  the  pace  and  the  direction  of  technical 
advance  in a broad sense and especially in the long run.  If the industry's technology advances, 
established companies as well as new business units will  need to adapt their business model in 
order to remain competitive. 
Conclusion 
Literature  on  established  firms  points  to  the  danger  of  not  only  'under-adaptation',  but  also 
'over-adaptation',  suggesting  the  existence  of  an  inverse  u-shaped  relationship  between 
adaptation and performance.  Since this relationship has not yet been investigated for a sample 
of  young,  entrepreneurial  companies,  it  deserves  further  research  attention.  In  addition, 
entrepreneurship  literature  suggests  that this  relationship  between  entrepreneurial  adaptation 
and  performance  may  be  moderated  by  characteristics  of  the  start-up  such  as  the 
characteristics and former experience of the founder(s)  and whether the company has its origin 
in  an  established  company  or  research  organization.  Sector  studies  insights  point  to  the 
possible moderating effect of maturity, capital intensity and  regime of technological opportunity 
on  the relationship between adaptation and  performance.  We can therefore conclude that new 
research  on  the  relationship  between  entrepreneurial  adaptation  and  performance  needs  to 
take into account these possibly moderating individual, company and sector characteristics. 
WHAT ABOUT THE PROCESS OF ADAPTATION? 
When  trying  to  understand  how  ventures  adapt their  initial  business  model,  we  can  draw  on 
insights  from  two  important  literature  streams:  the  life-cycle  literature  and  research  on  the 
development of innovations. On the one hand, life-cycle literature studies how ventures change 
over different stages of their life and  how each  of these  life stages  is  characterized  by specific 
opportunities  and  challenges.  The  challenge  of  adapting  its  initial  technology  and  business 
concept  into  a viable  business  model  is  one  such  challenge  faced  in  the  early  stages  of  a 
16 company's  life.  On  the  other  hand,  we  can  hope  to  gain  useful  insights from  research  on  the 
management  and  development  of  innovations.  Although  most  of  these  studies  have  taken 
place in  business units of large,  established organizations,  some insights may provide useful  in 
the context of technology-based ventures. 
Life-cycle literature 
Numerous studies in the life cycle literature (for an overview see:  Hanks at aI.,  1993; Kazanjian 
and  Drazin,  1989  & 1990;  Bamford  et  aI.,  1999;  Reynolds  and  Miller,  1992  or  Vesper,  1990) 
suggest that ventures change  over their life  and  that  it  is  exactly this change that  is crucial to 
their  success  and  survival.  Most  of  this  literature  argues  that  companies  progress  through 
different stages of growth  in  a fixed,  predictable order.  Life-cycle literature argues that  in  each 
stage of a company's life, specific growth and market opportunities (e.g.  Scott 1970; Chandler, 
1962)  as  well  as  challenges  (Greiner,  1972;  Kazanjian  and  Drazin,  1989)  and  demands 
(Siggelkow  & Levinthal,  2005)  must  be  addressed  through  the  use  of  adequate  skills  and 
organizational structure. There is no consistency in the literature on the number of life stages a 
company  can  go  through.  Three  stage,  four  stage  (e.g.  Kazanjian,  1989,  1990;  Hanks  et  aI., 
1993), five stage (e.g.  Galbraith,  1982; Greiner,  1972; Miller & Friesen,  1984), and  even  seven 
and ten  stage  models  have  been  proposed.  These differences  are  largely due to  the fact that 
most existing models were developed  in a conceptual manner, without much  empirical testing, 
as well as to the lack of specific measures for the relevant contextual and structural dimensions 
(Hanks et aI., 1993). 
When  reviewing  the  lifecycle  literature  (for  an  excellent  review,  see  Hanks  at  aI.,  1993  and 
Kazanjian  and  Drazin,  1989 & 1990),  we  are  forced  to  conclude  that the  majority of life cycle 
models do not provide us with  an adequate framework for studying entrepreneurial companies. 
Churchill  and  Lewis  (1983)  distinguish  three  reasons  for  this.  First  of  all,  the  assumption  of 
traditional  life  stage  models  that  companies  must  either  grow  or  die,  does  not  seem  to  hold 
(see  also Autio,  1997). A lot of entrepreneurial companies deliberately choose  to  stay small  in 
order  to  avoid  increased  complexity that  comes  with  growth  (Carter  and  Ram,  2003;  Storey, 
1994).  Others  do  not  see  opportunities  for  growth  due  to  the  bounded  rationality  of  the 
entrepreneurial  team.  A second  reason  is  that  traditional  life  stage  models  often  measure 
growth  in  terms  of  sales,  whereas  other  factors  - such  as  personnel,  turnover,  geographical 
l7 diversification,  changes  in  products  or  services,  and  value-added  - are  more  appropriate 
indicators of initial entrepreneurial growth. A last reason  is that most models do not pay enough 
attention  to  the  initial  stages  in  a company's  life.  For  the  purpose  of  our  research  on 
entrepreneurial adaptation, we  are especially interested in the literature on the early stages in a 
venture's  life.  It  is  in  this  stage  that  the  venture  needs  to  adapt  its  initial  technology  and 
business  concept  into a viable  business  model.  We  will  therefore turn  to  a number of models 
that do pay special attention to these early years. 
Uni-directional stage-based models 
In  general,  we  find  that  life-cycle  literature  distinguishes  between  two  phases  in  which  the 
development  and  adaptation  of  an  initial  idea  into  a viable  business  model  takes  place.  An 
overview  of these  models  is  shown  in  Figure  1.  In  a first  phase,  the  product  or  service  is 
developed  as  well  as  the  first  sales.  This  phase  has  been  termed  'start-up'  (Hanks  et  aI., 
1993), 'conception  and  development'  (Kazanjian  and  Drazin,  1989,  1990), 'existence' (Churcill 
and  Lewis,  1983),  etc.  During  this  stage,  the  product  or  service  is  developed,  often  through 
prototyping  (Kazanjin  and  Drazin,  1998,  1990).  Products  and  services  are  customized 
(Abernathy  and  Utterback,  1975,  1978)  to  suit  the  needs  of  innovators  and  early  adopters 
(Moore,  1995,  1999).  Other  authors  discern  between  different  phases  within  this  first  phase. 
Clarysse and Moray (2004)  as well as Vohora et al.  (2004),  in their study of academic spin-offs, 
find  evidence  for  the  existence  of  (1)  a research  or  idea  phase,  (2)  a phase  in  which  the 
opportunity  is  framed  and  validated,  (3)  a  phase  in  which  resources  and  organizational 
arrangements  are  put  in  place,  and  (4)  a phase  in  which  strategic  focus  is  gained,  where  the 
venture  tries  to  generate  revenues  and  possibly  adapts  its  business  model.  Vohora  et  al. 
(2004),  find  that a venture  must  pass through  the  previous  phase  in  order to  progress  to  the 
next one but that each  phase involves an iterative,  non-linear process of development in which 
there may be a need to revisit some of the earlier decisions and activities. 
In a second phase, the product or service is commercialized on a larger scale. The venture 
is  investing  heavily  in  growth  (Churchill  and  Lewis,  1983)  by  targeting  early  majority  (Moore, 
1995,  1999)  and  by  standardizing the  initial  prototypes  and  customized  products  (or  services) 
(Abernathy and  Utterback,  1975,  1978).  So  also  in  this  phase,  there  are  changes taking  place 
with  respect  to  target  customer  segments,  products  and  services;  all  aspects  of  the  initial 
business model. 
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Multi-directional and non-sequential models 
The  models  above  suggest  that  venture  develops  in  sequential  phases.  Quite  a number  of 
empirical  studies  obtained  results that  support the  lifecycle view  (see  for  example:  Miller  and 
Friesen,  1984;  Hanks  et  aI.,  1993;  Kazanjian  and  Drazin,  1989;  Roure  and  Keeley,  1990, 
Hansen  and  Bird,  1997).  Although  Vohora  et  al.  (2004)  argue that  each  phase of their  model 
involves an iterative, non-linear process of development in which there may be a need to revisit 
some of the earlier decisions and  activities,  they do propose that a venture must pass through 
the  previous  phase  in  order  to  progress  to  the  next  one.  Although  feedback  loops  appear 
necessary,  the  model  assumes  that  no  phases  can  be  skipped  and  that  there  exists  an 
'optimal', sequential order in the development of a company. 
Other  authors  however  have  argued  that  the  linear  idea  of a uni-directional  sequence  of  life 
stages  is  too  simplistic  (e.g.  Tornatzky  et  aI.,  1983;  Utterback,  1987).  They  suggest  that 
multiple paths through and towards these stages exist (e.g. Adizes,  1979).  Reynolds and Miller 
(1992)  and Gersick (1994)  have confirmed the stochastic nature of a firm's adaptive processes. 
Autio  (1997)  proposes a more systemic view,  moving away from a linear evolutionary view and 
looking  at  how firms  become  embedded  in  the  innovative  environment  in  which  they  operate. 
The  embeddedness of a firm  in  its  environment relates  to  the "Gestalt view." According to this 
view,  the  hypothesized  existence  of related  lifecycle phases should  be  criticized.  The  lifecycle 
model  should  then  be  replaced  by  different  and  distinct  organisational  categories.  Each 
category then  represents  an  adequate  organizational  approach  for  dealing  with  driving  forces 
such  as  technology,  environment,  internal  structure  and  leadership  (Kazanjian  and  Drazin, 
1989).  Among  these  "Gestalts,"  no  determined  progression  patterns  exist.  They  are  hence 
episodes  rather  than  phases  or  stages.  The  terminology  of  'episodes'  hence  underlines  the 
idea of non-linearity and multi-directionality. 
Recent  work  has  proposed  cyclical  models  of  venture  development.  Druilhe  and  Garnsey 
(2004),  describe venture  development as  an  iterative,  non-linear,  and  bi-directional  interaction 
between  shifting  opportunities  and  emerging  combinations  of resources  (see  Figure  2).  New 
businesses  then  go  through  alternating  cycles  of  opportunity  detection  and  resource 
mobilization,  combination  and  organization.  The  authors  find  that  the  interaction  between 
opportunities  and  resources  is  iterative,  non-linear,  and  bi-directional.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
19 type  of  business  opportunity  selected  in  the  initial  business  model  influences  the  resource 
requirements,  on the other hand,  improved knowledge of resources and opportunities will allow 
entrepreneurs to adapt and modify their business model. 
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Innovation literature 
The  literature  on  innovation  is  vast  and  diverse.  Hence,  it  is  not  our  goal  to  provide  an  all-
inclusive overview of its research findings here.  Only aspects deemed useful for gaining further 
insight  in  the  entrepreneurial  adaptation  process  will  be  discussed.  First,  we  will  discuss  the 
work of Van  de Ven  et al.  (1999)  who  have modeled the innovation process based  on  in-depth 
studies  in  business  units of established  organizations  as well  as  in  new ventures.  We  will  see 
that this  model  relates to  the  bi-directional  life-cycle  models discussed above.  Second,  we  will 
give  an  overview  of  relevant  findings  from  new  product  development  literature.  Whereas 
technology-based  ventures  try  to  develop  an  initial  technological  opportunity  into  a viable 
business  model,  new  product development teams struggle with  the transformation  of an  initial 
idea  into  a viable  product  for  their  company.  Because  of this  similarity,  the  insights  from  the 
new product development literature  - where  decision-making  under  uncertainty and  ambiguity 
has  since  long  been  a central  theme  - might  help  us  to  increase  our  understanding  of  the 
entrepreneurial adaptation process and of the variables influencing this process. 
The innovation process 
Van  de  Ven  et  al.  (1999)  model  the  innovation  process  (in  new  as  well  as  in  established 
companies)  as a cyclical process consisting of two phases in a set sequence of divergent and 
convergent  behavior  (see  Figure  3).  Divergence  involves  the  exploration  of  new  directions. 
Convergence on the other hand  implies testing  and exploiting a given direction.  The concepts 
of  divergence  and  convergence  are  highly  related  to  March's  discussion  of  exploration  and 
exploitation  (March,  1991).  Whereas  exploitation  refers  to  activities  like  refinement, 
implementation  and  execution,  exploration  denotes  search,  variation  and  discovery-oriented 
activities.  According  to  the  Van  de  Ven  et  al.  (1999),  it  is  the  complexity  of the  problem  that 
warrants divergent search  behavior.  Divergence is triggered  by the infusion  of resources while 
convergence  is  triggered  by  external  constraints  (such  as  institutional  rules)  and  internal 
20 constraints  (including  resource  limitations  and  the  discovery  of  a possibility  that  focuses 
attention)  limiting  the  complexity  of  the  problem.  This  model  is  characterized  by  the  same 
cyclicality  as the  life-cycle model  by  Druilhe and  Garnsey  (2004)  discussed  above.  Innovators 
alternate between episodes of divergence and convergence. 
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Van  de Ven  et al.  (1999)  pay special attention to the  different ways of learning  a company can 
and  must  use  in  order  to  develop  an  innovation.  They  suggest  that  in  the  divergent  phase, 
companies  must  learn  through  discovery,  by  exploring  a variety  of  new  directions.  In  the 
convergent phase, trial and error learning should take place  by testing a given,  more focused 
direction.  The  authors  consider  complexity  as  the  reason  for  choosing  one  way  of 
searching/learning over the other and suggest that this complexity results from different factors, 
namely  (1)  the  ambiguity  or  uncertainty  inherent  in  the  development of an  innovation,  (2)  the 
fact that most innovations consist of families of related new products and procedures and not of 
a single  new device,  product or procedure  (see  also the  notion  of platform  innovation  projects 
by Wheelwright and  Clark,  1992),  (3)  the  division of labor among  functions  and organizational 
units,  (4)  the  use  of  diversification  for  risk  reduction,  and  (5)  the  fact  that  complicated 
development  paths  may  result  from  pursuing  alternative  processes  in  different  parts  of  the 
innovation. 
The  model  by  Van  de  Ven  et  al.  (1999)  appears  more  realistic  than  the  life-cycle  models 
discussed  above  for  three  reasons.  A first  reason  is that  contrary to  many  models  from  life-
cycle  literature  which  are  developed  without  much  empirical  testing  (Hanks  et  aI.,  1993),  this 
model  is  based  on  detailed,  longitudinal empirical observations.  Second,  the cyclicality of their 
model  relates  to  and  confirms  the  bi-directionality  and  non-linearity  described  in  recent  life-
cycle  models.  And  third,  the  model  reserves  a specific - although  small  - role  for  complexity 
and ambiguity, the latter being the main driver for entrepreneurial adaptation (as shown above). 
New Product Development literature 
The  literature on  new product development may provide us with  additional insights  on  the  role 
of uncertainty and ambiguity in the entrepreneurial adaptation  process.  In the  literature on  new 
product  development  we  find  various  classifications  of  different  types  of  uncertainty. 
Sometimes,  uncertainty is classified  by  its source  (technicalities,  market issues,  quality issues, 
21 etc)  or  by  its  potential  impact  (see  for  example:  Chapman,  1990).  Other classifications  relate 
uncertainty to the  different management techniques required  dealing with them.  The latter type 
of  classifications  often  distinguishes  between  'uncertainty'  and  'ambiguity'  (see  for  example 
Schrader  et  aI.,  1993).  'Uncertainty'  is  thereby  defined  as  a situation  in  which  the  relevant 
decision  variables  are  known,  but  the  organization  does  not  know  the  exact  values  these 
variables  should  take.  There  thus  is  a difference  between the  amount of information available 
and  the  amount  of  information  required  to  execute  a task  at  hand  (Galbraith,  1977).  There 
hence  exists  an  information  asymmetry.  Under ambiguity  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  lack of 
clarity regarding the relationships between the variables and the problem solving algorithm and 
sometimes  even  about the  set  of relevant  decision  variables  itself.  Differing  interpretations of 
the  situation  exist.  It  is  unclear  to  the  actors  involved  which  information  is  needed  to  solve 
these differences (Van Looy,  Debackere & Bouwen, 2001).  De Meyer et al.  (2002) elaborate on 
this distinction: they talk about 'unforeseen uncertainty' and  'chaos' as two types of ambiguity, 
and about 'foreseen uncertainty' and 'variation' as two types of uncertainty. 
According  to  the  new  product  development  literature,  the  adequacy  of various  organizational 
approaches will differ depending on the presence and the balance of the degrees of uncertainty 
versus ambiguity (and  not on  the complexity of a problem  as  suggested  by Van  de Ven  et  aI., 
1999).  In situations dominated by uncertainty, 'traditional' project management is appropriate 
(Debackere  and  Van  Looy,  2003).  The  success  of  the  new  product  development  project 
depends  on  the  speed  and  the  resources  with  which  all  project  phases  are  completed. 
Extensive  use  of  clear  goals  and  planning  - using  milestones  and  phases  - can  reduce 
uncertainty  in  the  decision-making  process  and  should  reduce  lead-times  (see  for  example: 
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). 
In  situations  marked  by  high  levels  of  ambiguity,  characterized  by  different  interpretations  on 
the  nature  and  the  scope  of the  application  envisaged,  the  'traditional'  approach  of  planning 
and  intensive  preparation  of the  product  definition  is  not  longer  sustainable.  Flexibility  and 
adaptability (Iansiti,  1995;  Verganti  et  aI.,  1998)  allowing  for the continuous  inclusion  of new 
information  on  market  and  technological  developments  until  late  in  the  development  process 
(i.e.  the  pursuit  of a 'window  of opportunity'  as  suggested  by  MacCormack,  1998),  gathering 
and  incorporating  sufficient  knowledge  before  committing  to  one  specific  product  concept 
delaying  the  final  concept  choice,  and  experimenting  (i.e.  solving  problems  through  iterative, 
22 though  intelligently pursued,  trial  and  error)  then  become the  dominant organizational themes 
(Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Thomke et aI.,  1996; Verganti et aI.,  1998). 
The  different  organizational  strategies  that  might  be  deployed  as  a function  of  the  type  of 
uncertainty encountered during the project,  have  been further elaborated  by  Pich  et al.  (2002). 
They  discern  between  (1)  instructionist,  (2)  learning  and  (3)  selectionist approaches to project 
management  and  organization,  with  the  relevance  of  each  approach  depending  on  the 
(in)adequacy of the information available and the risk involved.  The authors suggest that these 
three project management approaches may represent different phases in a stage gate process, 
in  which  uncertainty  is  gradually  reduced  over  the  course  of  an  new  product  development 
project.  Note that this suggests a linear, uni-directional path through different stages, which we 
have shown to be a point of discussion in life-cycle literature. 
Conclusion 
The  model  by  Van  de  Ven  et  al  (1999)  is  an  interesting  representation  of  the  innovation 
process.  It is  based  on  detailed  empirical  observations  and  describes  innovation  as  a cyclical 
process  consisting  of  two  alternating  episodes  of  respectively  divergent  and  convergent 
behavior  .This  cyclicality  implies  that  it  is  non-linear  and  bi-directional  (features  that  have 
gained acceptance  in  more recent work on life-cycle models). The  authors consider complexity 
as  the  main  driver  behind  this  cyclical  model.  However,  in  the  context  of  new  ventures,  we 
might ask ourselves if uncertainty and  ambiguity should  not be  given a more prominent role  in 
this model.  We  have  indeed  shown that the  presence of uncertainty and  ambiguity  is  the  core 
reason  why new businesses are unable to  define a viable business  model  upfront.  It is exactly 
the presence of uncertainty and ambiguity that forces new businesses to adapt. Complexity can 
be  better  handled  when  ambiguity  is  minimal  or  absent.  Co-ordination  between  the  various 
tasks of a highly  complex  endeavor then  becomes  more  predictable.  Under circumstances of 
minimal  ambiguity,  the  interpretability of the  tasks  to  be  executed  increases,  as  well  as  their 
analyzability, while equivocality decreases (Perrow,  1967; Van  de Ven  & Delbecq,  1974; Daft & 
Macintosh,  1981;  Daft & Weick,  1984;  Daft & Lengel,  1986).  It hence  appears that uncertainty 
and ambiguity instead of complexity form the driver of the adaptation process.  Further modeling 
of the adaptation  process should take this into account. Attributing  more importance to the  role 
of uncertainty and  ambiguity  in the  adaptation  process could  also  be  substantiated  by findings 
23 in the new product development literature that management should  be made contingent on  the 
degree  of uncertainty  and  ambiguity  inherent  in  these  projects  (and  not  on  the  complexity  as 
suggested  by Van  de Ven  et  at"  1999), The  new product development literature also  provides 
us  with  detailed  insights  on  different types  or  degrees  of  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  (see  for 
example  De  Meyer et  aI.,  2002),  Also  - contrary to  the  distinction  between  the  divergent and 
convergent approach  by Van  de  Ven  et al.  - multiple management approaches  have  been  put 
forward  in  the  new  product  development  literature  (Pich  et  aI.,  2002),  We  should  therefore 
verify  whether  the  model  by  Van  de  Ven  et  al.  with  two  episodes  and  approaches  is  not  too 
crude a representation of the adaptation process, 
WHICH ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS ENABLE ADAPTATION? 
When  reviewing  the  literature  on  adaptation  in  entrepreneurial  companies,  we  find  that  not 
much  work  has  been  done  to  determine which  factors  enable a venture to  adapt  its  business 
model.  Pitt and  Kannemeyer (2000)  studied the effect of the  entrepreneur's personality traits 
(intolerance  of ambiguity,  locus of control,  and  risk taking  propensity)  on  the  degree to  which 
marketing  strategy  had  changed,  Stoica  and  Schindehutte  (1999)  find  that  organizational 
culture  is  related  to  entrepreneurial  adaptation,  Morris  et  al.  (1999)  suggest that  leadership 
and  a tradition of change might enable adaptation,  but do  not test these  hypotheses,  On the 
other  hand,  literature  on  adaptation  in  established  organizations  suggests  that  adaptation  is 
related to slack and inefficiency in resources  used  (McKee et aI.,  1989, Muzyka et aI.,  1995; 
Holbrook  et  ai,  2000),  Entrepreneurship  has  been  recognized  to  be  intimately connected  with 
the appearance  and  adjustment of unique and  idiosyncratic resources  (Alvarez,  2003),  To  our 
knowledge,  no one has studied the effect of resource availability on entrepreneurial adaptation, 
We  consider  this  an  important  question,  especially  since  research  shows  that  new  ventures 
often  have  difficulties  in  acquiring  resources  (see  our  discussion  of  liabilities  of  smallness, 
newness and foreignness), 
As  summarized  by  Shane  and  Stuart  (2002),  some  organizational  studies  propose  that  initial 
resource  endowments  have  lasting  effects  on  performance  (Stinchcombe,  1965;  Baron  et  aI., 
1996  and  2002;  Hannan,  1998),  Other  researchers  believe  that  these  initial  resource  stocks 
often  dissipate quickly (Bruderl  and  Schussler,  1990;  Fichman  and  Levinthal,  1991), Cockburn 
24 et  al.  (2000)  refer  to  this  duality.  They  point  out  that,  whereas  initially  population  ecology 
explained  differences in  performance  by differences in  firms'  initial conditions and the strategic 
management  literature  was  concerned  with  firms'  response  to  environmental  signals,  the 
current  understanding  is  that  inertial  forces  as  well  as  adaptation  have  a role  to  play.  Initial 
conditions  include the  prior  experience  and  initial  capabilities  of the  company  managers  (see 
for example  Helfat,  2000;  Helfat and  Raubitschek,  2000;  Klepper and  Simons,  2000;  Holbrook 
et ai,  2000;  Raff,  2000;  Cockburn  et ai,  2000;  Langlois and  Steinmuller,  2000).  Ongoing  efforts 
include  gathering  feedback  from  the  environment  (see  for  example  Helfat  and  Raubitschek, 
2000;  Holbrook et ai,  2000;  Raff,  2000),  paying  attention to the  various functional  areas  in  the 
company  (Holbrook et aI.,  2000),  acquiring  human and  physical assets  (Holbrook et aI.,  2000), 
and the presence of individual leadership (Rosenbloom, 2000). Also the ability of a company to 
change  is expected to  be determined  by the initial founding  conditions of the firm  as well  as by 
the  ongoing  efforts  it  makes  to  adapt  (Helfat,  2000;  Holbrook  et  aI.,  2000;  Langlois  & 
Steinmuller,  2000).  Shane and Stuart point out that there  is  not much evidence on  the effect of 
initial  resource  endowments  because  of  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  information  on  the  early 
phases of new ventures' lives. 
By complementing  existing  insights  on  change  in  established  organizations  with  findings  from 
the  innovation  and  entrepreneurship  literature,  we  now  develop  an  overview  of  possible 
enablers  for  entrepreneurial  adaptation.  The  first  two  factors  represent  initial  resource 
endowments,  while  the  next  five  effects  relate  to  resources  that  are  developed  over  the 
venture's life. 
The effect of  prior experience on adaptabilitv 
The  long-term  success  of  a technology-based  venture  is  associated  with  human  capital 
endowments (Bruderl et aI., 1992). Greater variation  in the industry experience of its founders 
(Eisenhardt  and  Schoon hoven,  1990),  founder's  experience  with  the  specific  technical 
problem (Nerkar and Shane, 2003)  and with starting-up new companies and/or with working 
in  new  ventures  appears  crucial  (Nerkar  and  Shane,  2003)1.  Eisenhardt  and  Schoon hoven 
(1990)  also found that the joint working experience of founding team  members enhances the 
I We must note however that some authors (see for example Carter and Ram, 2003; Kolvereid and 
Bullvag, 1992) refute the importance attributed to previous experience. 
25 venture's  chance  on  long-term  success.  Roberts  et  al.  (1968,  1969,  1970)  and  Littunen  and 
Tohmo  (2003)  show that  it is  important to  start a venture  with  a team  of entrepreneurs  and  a 
sufficient variety in the functional backgrounds of entrepreneurs and co-workers,  since 
this allows the venture to acquire a sufficiently large capabilities and knowledge base. 
It  is  not  unlikely that this  effect on  long-term  success  is  due  to  the  fact that a variety  in  prior 
experience enables adaptation.  Indeed,  Helfat and  Raubitschek (2000)  and also  Holbrook et al 
(2000)  point out how prior experience has an  impact on innovation and market entry decisions. 
As  summarized  by  Helfat  (2000),  organizational  change  is  constrained  by  initial  capabilities 
(Helfat and  Raubitschek,  2000;  Holbrook et ai,  2000;  Raff,  2000; Cockburn et ai, 2000;  Langlois 
and Steinmuller,  2000),  accumulated knowledge-bases,  and path-dependent cognition  (Tripsas 
and Gavetti, 2000). Also Klepper and Simons (2000)  show that pre-entry experience affects the 
amount  of  innovation,  and  thus  change,  in  a company.  The  school-of-experience  view  (see 
Christensen  and  Raynor,  2003;  McCall,  1998) suggests that the  problems entrepreneurs  have 
wrestled  with  in the past have' developed the skills and intuition for how to meet the challenge 
successfully the next time around' (Christensen and  Raynor,  2003,  p.  180).  Entrepreneurs who 
have  had  experience  in  adapting  their  strategy  or  business  model  - albeit  in  an  established 
company or in  an entrepreneurial company - will probably be better at adaptation  in the context 
of a new venture. 
The effect of  the initial technological platform on adaptability 
Tegarden  et  al.  (1999)  showed that  it  is  not the  initial technological  choice  of a company,  but 
the  adaptability  of  is  technological  capabilities,  that  determines  its  success.  However,  the 
broadness of a venture's technology platform may be of influence on  its adaptability.  Helfat 
and  Raubitschek (2000)  show how core knowledge - which they consider being often scientific 
or technological - can form foundation for multiple products and stages, across different vertical 
chains  as  well  as  within  vertical  chains.  Also  T  eece  et  al  (1997)  point  out that the  depth  and 
width  of technological opportunities  in the  neighborhood of a firm's  prior research  activities will 
impact its future options (see also Saemundsson and Dahlstrand, forthcoming). 
In  general,  a certain technology  can  be  developed  into a number of applications,  which  in turn 
can  be  developed  into  a number  of  product/market  combinations.  Miller  (2004)  shows  that 
26 diversifying  firms  have  a greater  breadth  of technology  than  their  industry  peers  prior  to  the 
diversification  event.  The  broader a company's technology  portfolio,  the  larger the  number of 
business  models on which information can  be  gathered  (see also Nerkar and  Shane,  2003,  on 
the  effect  of  general-purpose  technologies).  This  may  have  various  effects.  First  more 
information requires  longer information processing time,  and thus leads to  less rapid  changes. 
Second  however,  the  availability  of  more  information  will  enable  a venture  to  make  higher 
quality decision with respect to  change.  And third,  statistically speaking,  the  larger the  number 
of  business  models,  the  higher  the  chance  that  one  of  these  combinations  turns  out  to  be 
valuable for further  development.  The  broader a venture's technology platform, the smaller the 
chance that it will  have to  depart from  it.  If a venture  has to depart from  its existing technology 
platform  in order to  generate/consider a number of additional options,  its survival  may become 
seriously endangered.  It  does appear  however, that companies  should  not incorporate the full 
breadth of their technology platform into one product.  Cottrell and  Nault (2004)  in their study of 
the  microcomputer software  industry,  find  that  product covering  more  computer  platforms  will 
perform  worse.  The  use  of  a broad  technological  knowledge  therefore  does  not  lie  in  the 
possibility to  produce  an  all-comprehensive  product  but  in  the  potential  for  diversification  and 
adaptation. 
The effect of financial resources on adaptabilitv 
The availability of and the  access to financial resources  need to  be taken  into account as  an 
influencing  variable.  Financial  resources  will  have  an  effect  on  the  adaptability  of  a new 
technology-based  venture.  Holbrook  et  al  (2000)  show  how  the  inability  to  acquire  physical 
assets  may hinder a firm's ability to  change.  Existing  literature states that a certain  amount of 
slack  has  to  be  available  for  opportunity  capture  (Muzyka  et  aI.,  1995;  Evans  and  Jovanovic, 
2002), but that this does not mean that huge amounts of financing are needed (Dorfman, 1983; 
Stevenson and Gumpert 1985). 
The effect of  human resources on adaptabilitv 
Existing  literature  points  to  the  importance  of  internal  human  resources  for  new  technology-
based ventures.  Holbrook et al  (2000)  point out how the  inability to  acquire human assets may 
27 hinder a firm's  ability to  change.  The  internal  organization  (such  as  internal  R&D,  knowledge 
systems, and personnel) may enable or inhibit adaptation of the venture. 
Successful  exploitation  of  important  information  and  technology  - albeit  from  customers, 
suppliers or other external  partners - is  related  to the capacity of adapting  and  improving this 
technology through  internal  R&D.  Complementarities of external and  social capital on the one 
hand,  and  internal capabilities on  the other hand  are  necessary.  Linkages with  universities for 
example,  do  not lead  to  performance if internal capabilities or "absorptive capacity" are absent 
(Lee  et  aI.,  2001,  Cohen  & Levinthal,  1990).  In  his study of British  science  parks,  Macdonald 
(1987)  already  stressed  that  pleasant  surroundings  and  the  presence  of a university  are  not 
enough.  For  these  parks  to  succeed,  an  internal  critical  mass  of  resources  and  information 
networks  is  needed.  However,  van  Dierdonck  et  al.  (1991)  propose  that  this  internal  critical 
mass  is  not a sufficient condition  for  success.  New technological  development  is  not confined 
to  a specific  region  but  occurs  in  broader  professional  communities.  Science  parks  therefore 
need to be part of a broader and often international  R&D community network. 
Knowledge  intensive  ventures  need  to  turn  scientific/technical  ambitions  into  solid  market 
developments  - including  the  challenge  of  complementing  their  technological/scientific 
strengths  with  those  on  the  level  of management  and  market  orientation  on  the  level  of  the 
personnel  (Deeds  et  aI.,  1999).  Roberts  et.al.  (1968,  1969,  1970)  already  found  that  the 
success  of  technology-based  university  spin-offs  was  related  to  the  attention  paid  to 
managerial  issues.  Helfat  and  Raubitschek  (2000)  pointed  to  the  importance  of  obtaining 
market feedback.  Technology-based  ventures  need  to  couple  development,  production  and 
marketing  (Freeman,  1991).  The  ability  of  entrepreneurial  firms  to  continue  identifying  and 
developing  new opportunities depends  on  the ability of its  members to  share  and  to  articulate 
knowledge (West,  2001). 
The literature suggests that it is not sufficient to develop R&D,  production, marketing, sales and 
general  management  skills.  In  addition,  there  needs  to  be  a close  coordination  between  the 
different  functions.  The  transformation  of  an  entrepreneurial  to  an  established  organization 
'involves  a gradual accretive process  that requires  purposive  coordination  of efforts  across 
functions and cross time' (Bhide,  2000,  p.  288).  Holbrook  et  al  (2000),  in  their  case  study  of 
Motorola,  attribute the  company's  dynamic capability to the  skill  of its  managers to  coordinate 
R&D,  marketing, and production.  One suggestion  in this respect is the use of a cross-functional 
28 structure  in  larger,  established  organizations.  Because  of  the  small  number  of  employees 
typical  for  new ventures,  the  development of such  a sophisticated  structure  does  not  appear 
necessary  or  beneficial.  Close  coordination  however  does  make  sense.  Bhide  (2000)  in  this 
respect  attributes  to  the  entrepreneur  the  crucial  role  of  coordinator.  Whereas  managers  of 
established companies risk being overwhelmed  by coordination  mechanisms, the entrepreneur 
needs to build them more or less from scratch. 
The effect of formal networking on adaptability 
As summarized  by  Helfat (2000),  acquisitions  (Karim  & Mitchell,  2000;  Eisenhardt and  Martin, 
2000)  and feedback from the environment (Helfat and Raubitschek,  2000; Holbrook et ai,  2000; 
Raff,  2000)  are  important vehicles  for change.  Holbrook et al  (2000)  show how the  inability to 
acquire external  know-how and information may hinder a firm's  ability to  change.  The  ability to 
monitor and forecast constitute the dynamic capability of a firm. 
Although  new ventures are normally not in the position to  acquire other companies,  alternative 
suggestions  for  gathering  information  and  feedback  have  been  put  forward  in  the  literature. 
Especially  the  positive  effects  of  networking  (often  treated  in  relation  with  geographical 
proximity)  have  been  discussed  extensively  from  the  perspective  of  resource  dependence 
theory, from social capital theory,  and transaction cost perspective (see for example, Steensma 
et  aI.,  2000;  Lee,  Lee  & Pennings,  2001,  Vii-Renko,  Autio  & Sapienza,  2001,  Littunen  and 
Tohmo,  2003; Thornton and Flynn, 2003). 
In  order  to  be  adaptable,  the  new  venture  needs  up-to-date  information  on  changing 
technologies  and  markets  needs  (see  also  Kaufman  et.  aI.,  2000;  Low  & MacMillan,  1988; 
Saxenian 1994).  By using customer feedback, the  product can  be targeted to the  needs of the 
emerging  market. This  may even imply shifting away from original technical efforts.  Networking 
with (potential) customers thus allows for adaptability. 
Not  only  does  networking  - with  small  as  well  as  large  firms,  with  competitors  as  well  as 
strategic suppliers (Kaufman et.  aI.,  2000) - provide a firm with information on technological and 
market  changes,  it  also  reduces  development  costs  and  risk  of  irreversibility  (Stuart,  2000). 
Small  firms  do  very  often  not  possess  all  the  resources  and  capabilities  that  are  needed  for 
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long  term.  Indeed,  when  organizations  internalize  all  the  needed  resources,  these  tend  to 
become more specific, limiting the range of choices available for the firm (Foray, 1991; see also 
the  discussion  of  commitment  versus  flexibility  by  Ghemawat  and  del  Sol,  1998).  In  the 
terminology  of  Ghemawat  and  del  Sol  (1998),  networking  relationships  are  firm-specific  and 
usage-flexible  resources,  allowing  for  commitment  and  flexilbility  at  the  same  time  (see  also 
Stuart, 2000;  Larson, 1992; Nohria and  Eccles, 1992). 
Another  positive  effect of networking  can  be  found  when  looking  at  changes  in  geographical 
diversification.  Alliances  can  complement  or form  a useful  alternative  for  FDI  (Lu  & Beamish, 
2001).  Collaboration with foreign  partners  provides  knowledge  of and  access to  local  markets, 
reduces costs  and  market uncertainty,  and allows for adaptability,  by leveraging the resources 
of local partners, rather than committing own resources (Schrader,  2001;  Lu & Beamish, 2001). 
While  literature  treats  in  great  length  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  alliances  and 
partnerships,  in  our  view,  it  does  not  pay  enough  attention  to  the  prerequisites  for  a new 
venture  to  enter  beneficial  alliances.  The  success  of  a  venture  in  creating  long-term 
relationships  depends  on  its  reputation  and  complementary  assets  (Teubal  et  aI.,  1991). 
Ventures will  be  able to  enter into relationships with  interesting partners when they are  able to 
offer specialized,  unique skills (see also Smith et aI.,  1991).  In order to ally, firms need to bring 
something  to the  alliance.  However,  in  the  light of our discussion  of liabilities of newness and 
smallness,  we  need to raise the question whether new ventures have the potential to do this.  It 
is  not  unlikely that  there  is  only  a low  likelihood that  a new  venture  succeeds  in  forming  a 
partnership. 
In this  regard,  Shaver and  Flyer  (2000)  point to the  danger of adverse selection in  networks. 
They  suggest  that  weaker  firms  have  more  incentives  for  geographical  clustering  and 
networking,  as compared to  strong firms that have  less to  gain. A strong  partner would  be one 
that is able to  offer some of the assets which the new venture needs but is not able to  acquire 
or develop itself.  In other words, a strong partner has relevant complementarities to offer. 
As discussed  above,  networking can  have  an  effect on the adaptability of a venture.  However, 
we  suggest that this not necessarily always the  case.  The  process of developing a solid  basis 
for  collaboration  - consisting  of  mutual  trust  and/or  contract  agreements  - takes  time, 
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1991). The efforts  put into  establishing a solid  partnership can  be  compensated  if a venture  is 
able  to  find  a partner  that  is  worth  going  through  all  this  trouble.  A first  criterion  for  partner 
selection  is  that  he  must  have  relevant  complementarities.  A second  criterion  relates  to  the 
exclusivity of the partnership. While literature treats  in great length the advantages of alliances, 
the  long-term  effects  of  networking  and  geographical  clustering  on  innovative  capacity  and 
information processing  may  be  less positive.  If relations with  key customers become too close, 
they  may  insulate  small  firms  from  other  sources  of  information  and  foreclose  opportunities. 
Indeed,  as  the  level  of trust  and  the  quality  of the  relationship  become  higher,  the  need  to 
monitor  diminishes,  decreasing  the  level  of  information  processing  (Yli-Renko,  Autio  & 
Sapienza,  2001).  Furthermore, a company's scope may become restricted to that of the cluster 
Inetwork  (Pouder  & St  John,  1996).  This  relates  to  Granovetter's  argument  (1973)  on  the 
bridging  power  of weak ties.  Information  spreads  rapidly  within  strong  cliques.  Therefore,  the 
diffusion of new  ideas must come through the weak ties that connect people or businesses  in 
separate  cliques  (Debackere  and  Clarysse,  1998).  As  the  resources  of  collaborative  firms 
become  more  integrated,  and  thus - according  to  Foray  (1991) - more  specific,  the  range  of 
options  that  a firm  has,  decreases.  Collective  learning  within  networks  is  linked  to  specific 
technologies  and  therefore  diffusion  of innovation  is  often  based  on  incremental  adjustments. 
During  periods of radical technological change,  adherence to a network may therefore become 
an  exit  barrier  from  the  established  form  of  production  (Bianchi  & Bellini,  1991,  Glasmeier, 
1991), thus inhibiting adaptiveness and flexibility.  The existence of complementarities  as well 
as  the  exclusivity  of  the  partnership  may  therefore  determine  the  effect  of  networking  on 
adaptability. When a new venture partners up with a company that does not have any relevant 
complementarities,  it will  not be  able to  gather or co-construct any necessary information  from 
this  alliance.  Under exclusivity,  the  venture  will  not be  allowed  to  look for  relevant information 
elsewhere  (that is:  in other partnerships), and its adaptability will thus be negatively influenced. 
Under  non-exclusivity,  the  venture  will  have  more  freedom  to  look  for  relevant  information 
elsewhere, and its adaptability will be un-influenced. However, non-exclusivity may also provide 
the venture with fewer resources.  In  addition, enhanced  performance does  not only depend on 
the value of the individual alliances, but also on the way these alliances are configured into an 
efficient  network,  with  a minimum  of redundancy,  internal  conflict  and  complexity  on  the  one 
hand,  and  a maximum  of  diverse  information  and  capabilities  on  the  other  hand  (Baum, 
Calabrese & Silverman, 2000). 
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The  absorptive  capacity  of  an  organization  will  influence  its  ability  to  use  new  information 
(Roberts,  1991)  such  as  information gathered through  networking  (F erriani,  work in  progress). 
Absorptive  capacity  can  be  defined  as  'the  ability  to  recognize  the  value  of new  information, 
assimilate  it,  and  apply  it  to  commercial  use'  and  has  been  shown  to  be  related  to  an 
organization's  preexisting  knowledge  structure  (Cohen  & Levinthal,  1990).  In  the  case  of new 
technology-based ventures, the  preexisting knowledge structure consists of knowledge present 
at founding  (e.g.  broadness of initial technology platform and  prior experience of the founders; 
see  also  Shane,  2002),  as  well  as  knowledge  that  is  accumulated  over  the  venture's  life 
through for example attention paid to different functions. 
We  may  also  expect  an  interaction  effect  between  the  prior entrepreneurial  experience  of the 
founders  on  the  one  hand  and financial  resources  on  the  other  hand.  This  may  be  especially 
true  if the  company  can  attract venture  capital.  Venture  capitalists  may provide  entrepreneurs 
with  much  more  than  just  financial  resources  (Hsu,  2004a).  Their  services  may  include 
business  referral,  mentoring,  industry  knowledge,  recruitment  assistance,  etc.  Venture 
capitalists  differ  in  their  value-added  potential  (Hsu,  2004a;  Bygrave  and  Timmons,  1992; 
Sahlman,  1997).  In  addition,  founders  of new ventures  differ  in  their ability to  acquire venture 
capital.  Entrepreneurial founding  experience affects the timing  and  valuation of venture capital 
funding  (Hsu,  2004b).  Founders  with  prior  experience  of starting-up  businesses  may  also  be 
able to  acquire 'higher-quality' capital,  such  as  investments from  experienced,  well-networked 
venture  capitalists.  This  means  that the  effect  of financial  resources  on  adaptation  may  differ 
depending  on  the  experience  of  the  founders.  This  effect  may  be  larger  for  experienced 
founders  because  of  the  higher  intrinsic  quality  of  the  financial  resources  they  are  able  to 
gather. 
Conclusion 
When  reviewing  the  literature  on  adaptation  in  entrepreneurial  companies,  we  find  that  not 
much  work  has  been  done to  determine  which  factors  enable a venture to  adapt  its  business 
model.  Literature on adaptation  in established organizations suggests that adaptation  is related 
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in  the  context  of  entrepreneurial  start-ups.  This  is  particularly  surprising  given  the  difficulties 
new ventures often  have  in  acquiring  resources  (see our discussion  of liabilities of smallness, 
newness and foreignness).  We therefore conclude that more research  is needed to  investigate 
the  effect  of  resource  availability  (and  substitutes  such  as  alliances)  on  entrepreneurial 
adaptation.  Furthermore, some organizational studies propose that initial resource endowments 
have  lasting  effects  on  performance,  while  others  attribute  more  importance  to  continuously 
developed  resources.  Therefore,  when  researching  the  effect  of  resource  availability  and 
alliances on entrepreneurial adaptation, we need to look at initial resource endowments as well 
as at the resources acquired later on, and at the resource acquisition process iself. 
THE CONCEPT OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ADAPTATION PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE 
In the context of new venture development, adaptation refers to the  entrepreneur's willingness 
and ability to  make appropriate adjustments to the business model as the venture evolves from 
an  initial idea  or business  plan through  the  early stages of the organizational  life-cycle  (Morris 
et aI.,  1999;  Pitt and  Kannemeyer,  2000).  For reasons of clarity,  it  is important to  discuss  how 
this  concept  of  'entrepreneurial  adaptation'  relates  to  the  more  traditional  concepts  of 
adaptation and change in existing literature. 
The concepts of adaptive behavior and  change  are used  in a variety of contexts.  Literature on 
change  in  groups  (see  for  example  Okhuysen,  2001;  Isenberg,  1981)  points  out that  in  order 
for  a group  to  accomplish  an  ambiguous  task,  the  ability  to  change  to  meet  unexpected 
challenges  or  to  take  advantage  of  new  opportunities  is  critical.  As  the  requirements  for  the 
task  become  evident,  the  group  needs  to  adapt  and  change  its  activities  accordingly.  Also  in 
research  on  new product development (see for example  lansiti,  1995; Verganti  e1.  aI.,  1998) 
the  success  of a project  is  attributed  to  a team's  flexibility  and  adaptiveness  to  continuously 
incorporate  new  information  on  markets  and  technological  developments  until  late  in  the 
development process.  The  longer a project team  has worked together,  the  more this ability to 
continuously  incorporate  new  information  decreases  because  team  members  become  averse 
to  and  uninterested  in  information  which  is  not  generated  internally  (the  not-invented-here 
syndrome  as  described  by  Katz  and  Allen,  1982).  Case  studies  on  regional  development 
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regional  clusters  (see  for  example  Storper  and  Harrison,  1991;  Saxenian,  1994).  In  addition 
change  in  the  structure  of  industries  has  been  addressed  in  depth  by  literature  on  industry 
evolution  (see  for  example  Rumelt,  1984;  Utterback,  1987;  Klepper  and  Simons,  2000; 
Barnett,  1995;  Klepper  and  Graddy,  1990).  The  concepts  of  adaptation  and  change  are 
certainly relevant on the level of groups, teams, clusters of firms and industries.  In the following 
section, however, we will restrict ourselves to discussing them on the level of the organization. 
We will  start by reviewing  existing  definitions of organizational  change.  We  will then  discuss a 
number of prominent  streams  in  the  change  literature.  To  conclude,  we  will  analyze  how the 
concept  of  'entrepreneurial  adaptation'  relates  to  the  existing  literature  and  where  its  value-
added lies. 
Definitions of  change: dimensions of  pressure, radicalitv and timing 
Organizations  can  be  viewed  as  dynamic  systems of adaptation  and  change  - two  terms  that 
are often  used  interchangeably - that contain  multiple parts that interact with  one another and 
the  environment  (Morel  & Ramanujan,  1999).  Existing views  on  adaptation  and  their definition 
of  'change'  differ  with  respect  to  (1)  whether  the  pressures  for  change  reside  within  the 
organization  or within  the environment with  which  it  interacts and  with  respect to  (2)  radicality 
and timing of change. 
Internal versus external pressures for change 
There exist different perspectives on whether the pressures for change  are internal or external 
to the organization (for an overview, see Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2005). Change or adaptation is 
often  seen  as  an  organization's  response  to  changes  in  external  factors,  threats  and 
opportunities. Organizational adaptation or change is then defined as "  ... change in a significant 
organizational attribute, such as basic business strategy or organizational structure in response 
to environmental changes ... "(Kraatz, 1998). 
Just  as  some  research  stream  look  at  environmental  pressures,  others  focus  on  internal 
pressures for organizational change.  As shown  by Siggelkow & Levinthal  (2005),  authors such 
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and most life-cycle models adhere to this perspective. 
A more  inclusive  view  on  change  suggests  that  both  external  and  internal  pressures  for 
change are relevant (Morel and  Ramanujan,  1999). Also the innovation literature pays attention 
to internal as well as external change forces.  Examples are the distinction between market pull 
and technology  push,  the  concept of architectural  innovation  (Henderson  and  Clark,  1990)  as 
an  internal driver for innovation,  and  also the moving focus  from  product solutions to customer 
solutions  as  an  indication  of  external  pressures  for  change  (von  Hippel,  1988;  Christensen, 
1997; Christensen and  Raynor,  2003). We can then define organizational change or adaptation 
as  change  in  a significant  organizational  attribute  in  response  to  changes  internal  and/or 
external to the organization. 
Timing and  Radicalness of change 
Literature distinguishes between radical  and gradual change.  The distinction between radical 
and  gradual  change  often  appears  inextricably  coupled  to  the  one  between  periodical  and 
continuous  change.  Different perspectives  exist  on  how change  is  distributed  over time  (for 
an  overview,  see  Tyre  and  Orlikowski,  1994).  While  some  research  streams  put  forward  the 
idea that change  is continuously distributed over time,  others propose that change takes place 
through periodic, on-time corrections. 
One-time  corrections  are  for  example  put  forward  in  life-cycle  literature  (Gersick,  1994; 
Romanelli  & Tushman,  1994; Tushman  & Romanelli,  1985).  Similarly,  Winter  (2003)  suggests 
that one way of dealing with change is by 'firefighting' or ad hoc problem solving. This type of 
high-paced,  contingent  opportunistic,  perhaps  creative  search  for  satisfactory  alternative 
behaviors typically  appears  as  a response  to  novel  challenges  from  the environment  or  other 
relatively  unpredictable  events.  Ad  hoc  problem  solving  behaviors  are  largely  non-repetitive 
and  intendedly  rational;  they  are  not  routines,  not  highly  patterned  and  not  repetitious.  An 
advantage  of  ad  hoc  problem  solving  is  that  its  cost  largely  disappear  when  there  are  no 
problems to solve or changes to make. 
However, when  change  is frequent and 'firefighting' becomes expensive, then different - more 
continuous  - ways  of  dealing  with  it  should  be  taken  into  consideration  (Winter,  2003).  Also 
studies on  innovation  (Brown  & Eisenhardt  1997;  Muzyka  & de  Koning,  1995;  Nonaka,  2000) 
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change  over  extended  periods  of  time.  T  eece  et  al  (1997)  look  at  how  firms  operating  in 
environments  of  rapid  technological  change  are  able  to  achieve  and  sustain  competitive 
advantage.  The  ability of a firm  to  achieve  new forms  of competitive  advantage  are  generally 
termed dynamic capabilities (Teece et aI., 1997). 
Dynamic capabilities 
The  notion  of continuous  change  or  adaptation  is  closely  related  to  the  concept  of 'dynamic 
capabilities'.  In contrast to 'ad  hoc problem solving' (see Winter,  2003), the concept of dynamic 
capabilities  refers  to  continuous  change.  A firm's  competitive  advantage  can  be  eroded, 
depending  on  the  stability  of  market  demand,  the  ease  of  replicability  and  imitability. 
Organizational capabilities that are the source of competitive advantage in equilibrium - termed 
zero-level  capabilities  by  Winter  (2003)  - may  become  inadequate  for  sustaining  this 
competitive  advantage  under  conditions  of  change.  Dynamic  capabilities  are  considered  the 
source of sustained competitive advantage  in  changing  markets.  They relate to the capacity to 
renew  competences  so  as  to  achieve  congruence  with  the  changing  business  environment. 
Eisenhardt  &  Martin  (2000)  therefore  consider  research  on  dynamic  capabilities  as  the 
extension  of the  resource-based  view  to  dynamic  markets.  Winter  (2003)  points  to  the  broad 
consensus  in  literature  that  dynamic  capabilities  contrast  with  ordinary  capabilities  by  being 
concerned  with  change.  According  to  Collis  (1994)  dynamic  capabilities  govern  the  rate  of 
change  of  ordinary  capabilities.  In  Winter's  terms  (2003),  this  corresponds  to  first-order 
capabilities,  representing  change  in  the  zero-level  capabilities.  Examples  are  capabilities  that 
change the product the production process, the scale,  or the customers.  Product development 
strategic decision making,  and alliancing  have  been  put forward  as concrete examples of first-
order  dynamic  capabilities  (Eisenhardt  & Martin,  2000;  Teece  et  aI.,  1997).  The  difference 
between  zero-order and  first-order capabilities  is closely related  to  Collin's distinction  between 
static,  dynamic,  and  creative capabilities.  So,  according  to  the  existing  literature,  dynamic 
capabilities are concerned with changes in zero-order capabilities. 
According to Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) dynamic capabilities integrate, reconfigure,  gain and 
release  resources.  Similarly,  Teece  et  al.  (1997)  propose  that  dynamic  capabilities  are  about 
continuously integrating,  building and  reconfiguring  internal  and  external  competences to 
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and processes (e.g. quality, miniaturization, systems integration) that are typically viable across 
multiple product lines and  even outside the organization  (see  also  Helfat & Raubitschek,  2000; 
Helfat  & Peteraf,  2003).  Eisenhardt  & Martin  (2000)  propose  that  dynamic  capabilities  are 
idiosyncratic  in  their details.  They  are  specific  to  every individual firm  since  they emerge from 
the  path-dependent  history  of  this  specific  firm.  However,  dynamic  capabilities  also  exhibit 
common  features  associated  with  best  practices  across  firms.  This  implies  that  there  are 
multiple  (idiosyncratic)  ways  of  developing  similar  dynamic  capabilities  (i.e.  with  common 
features).  The  value  of  dynamic  capabilities  for  sustainable  competitive  advantage  therefore 
does  not  lie  in  the  dynamic  capabilities  themselves,  but  in  the  resource  configurations  they 
create,  by  enhancing  existing  resource  configurations,  by  building  new  ones  or  by  releasing 
resources that no longer provide competitive advantage (Eisenhardt &  Martin, 2000). 
The  literature  on  change  exhibits  a variety  of  concepts  related  to  the  notion  of  'dynamic 
capabilities'.  As  pointed  out  by  Eisenhardt and  Martin  (2000)  and  Dosi  et al  (2002),  the terms 
'competences' - as  in  'architectural competences'  (Henderson  and  Cockburn,  1994)  and  'core 
competences'  (Prahalad  and  Hamel,  1990)  - and  also  'combinative  capabilities'  (Kogut  and 
Zander,  1992)  are  very  similar  to  'dynamic  capabilities';  all  being  concerned  with  the  firm's 
ability to carry off the balancing act between continuity and change in  its capabilities. 
The building blocks of dynamic capabilities 
A good starting  point for understanding the concepts of capabilities  and  dynamic capabilities  is 
the  research  on  competitive  advantage  of  organizations.  According  to  the  resource-based 
view of the  firm,  organizations  can  achieve  competitive  advantage  when  they  have  resources 
that  are  valuable,  rare,  inimitable,  and  non-substitutable  (Eisenhardt  and  Martin,  2000). 
Although  some  authors  (e.g.  Barney,  1986)  consider  all  resources  as  buyable  and  separable 
from  the firm  context.  the generally accepted view  is that some resources  are  not for sale  and 
can  only  be gradually accumulated and  shaped within the firm.  In  addition, they may not be of 
any value in the market when offered  in  isolation.  Unique, difficult-to-imitate resources acquired 
through  organizational  learning  are  then  seen  as  sources  of competitive  advantage  (Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989). 
According  to  Dosi  et  al.  (2002),  capabilities  are  a prominent  example  of  such  gradually 
accumulated  and  shaped  resources,  critical  for  a firm's  competitive  advantage.  They  define 
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its  characteristic  'output'  actions':  Some  examples  of  organizational  capabilities  are  the 
production,  marketing,  sales  of a product  or  service.  Essential  to  the  notion  of capabilities  is 
that  they  cannot  be  readily  assembled  through  markets  (Teece  et  ai.,  1997;  Teece,  1982, 
Zander and  Kogut. 1995). 
Dosi  et  al.  (2002)  elaborate  on  the  difference  and  relation  between  capabilities  and  routines. 
Capabilities  in  their  view  relate  to  "a  fairly  large-scale  unit  of analysis,  one  that  has  a 
recognizable purpose expressed in terms of  the significant outcomes it is supposed to enable, 
and that is significantly shaped by conscious decision both in its development and deployment." 
The  role  of  intentionality,  conscious  deliberation,  planning,  and  expertise  for  building 
capabilities contrasts and adds to the evolutionary view that low-level operating routines quasi-
automatically will  lead  to  performance.  Whereas  the  building  of an  organizational  capability  is 
intentional, specific exercise thereof may be intentional but may also  be quite automatic.  In the 
latter case, capabilities are structured through a self-organizing,  bottom-up process rather than 
through  the  intention  to  exercise  them.  This  distinction  between  the  purposeful  building  of 
capabilities  and  the  quasi-automatic  exercise  thereof,  relates  closely  to  Winter's  definition 
(2003)  of  organizational  capability  as  'a  high-level  routine  (or  collection  of routines)  that, 
together with its implementing input flows,  confers upon an organization's management a set of 
decision options for producing significant outputs of a particular type'  and  to  Collis'  definition 
(1994)  of  organizational  capabilities  as  "the  socially  complex  routines  that  determine  the 
efficiency with which firms physically transform inputs into outputs': 
Nelson  & Winter  (1982)  view  routine  as  organizational  memory:  organizations  remember  a 
routine  by  doing/exercising  it.  Similarly,  Winter  (2003)  describes  routines  as  behavior  that  is 
learned, highly patterned, repetitious,  or quasi-repetitious, founded  part in tacit knowledge. This 
emphasis on repetition and frequency over long periods of time corresponds to the view of Dosi 
et al.  (2002) that capabilities involve the execution of high-frequency, repetitive  daily business. 
Routines  are  regarded  as  the  building  blocks  of  capabilities,  although  other  building  blocks 
such  as  individual  skills  (where  'skills'  on  the  individual  level  correspond  to  'routines'  on  the 
organizational  level;  see  Nelson  & Winter,  1982)  exist  as  well.  Some  routines  may  be  called 
organizational  capabilities  if they  satisfy  the  criteria  of  fairly  large-scale,  purposefulness  and 
intentionality  (Dosi  et  ai.,  2002).  So,  according  to  the  existing  literature,  capabilities 
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repetition over long periods of time. 
Capabilities  are  generally  characterized  as  complicated  routines  that  emerge  from  path-
dependent  processes  (Nelson  &  Winter,  1982).  T  eece  et  al.  (1997)  demonstrate  that 
processes (i.e. current routines)  are shaped by the firm's current asset positions and molded by 
its  paths. These  path-dependencies exist because  learning tends to  be  local.  Related  reasons 
- as  put  forward  by  Nelson  and  Winter  (1982)  - are  that  control  processes  of organizations 
tend  to  resist  mutation,  and  that change  takes the  path  of least resistance.  Dosi  et  al.  (2002) 
show  how  this  aspect  of  firm  capabilities  relates  to  Evolutionary  Economics,  where  firm 
capabilities  are  not considered  to  change  radically  in  short  periods  of time.  Instead,  the 
emphasis  is  on  accumulation  of  capabilities  and  the  fact  that  the  options  for  further 
development are  limited  by  past decisions. A nice illustration  is the  suggestion  by  Nelson  and 
Winter  (1982)  that their findings  may  have  relevance  for  certain  types  of innovation,  however 
not  for  organizations  such  as  R&D  laboratories  and  consulting  firms  that  are  involved  in  the 
production  or  management of economic  change  as  their  principal  function.  They suggest that 
innovation  in  organizational  routines  consists  to  a substantial  extent  of  a recombination  of 
existing routines  and  that  highly flexible  adaptation  to  change thus  is  not likely to characterize 
the behavior of individual firms.  As shown  by Teece et al.  (1997), the  Resource-Based View of 
the  firm  takes  a very  similar  stance,  in  that  it  considers  resources/capabilities/endowments 
sticky in the short-run. Or as Cockburn et al  (2000) put it: "The Resource based view of  the firm 
often  seems  to  suggest  that  organizations  can  only  change  through  limited,  local  search. 
Strategy is then not only about the  cognitive ability of senior management and their ability to 
make  the  'right' decisions,  but also about their ability to  work creatively with the raw material 
presented by their firm and their environment. "So, according to existing literature, routines 
and capabilities cannot change radically in short periods of time. 
The applicability of 'dynamic capabilities' beyond situations of gradual change 
Some  of the  characteristics  of dynamic capabilities  discussed  above  have  limited the  general 
use  of the  'dynamic capabilities'  concept to  situations of moderate  change.  As  argued  above, 
purposeful  routines  form  the  building  blocks  of zero-level  as  well  as  higher-order capabilities. 
Routines  - and  thereby  also  dynamic  capabilities  - can  only  be  learnt  through  frequent 
repetition  over  long  periods  of  time.  They  will  normally  stop  being  repeated  (at  least 
purposefully)  when  change  renders  them  obsolete.  The  logical  conclusion  appears  then  that 
39 dynamic capabilities can only be developed when circumstances are relatively unchanged over 
a significant period of time.  This is exactly the stance that Nelson and Winter (1982) take when 
pointing out the limitations of their work on capabilities.  Because of the notion of 'routines', they 
describe their work as being related  mainly to organizations that provide goods or services that 
are  visibly  the  same  over  extended  periods  of  time.  So,  according  to  existing  literature, 
capabilities  and  thus  also  dynamic  capabilities  can  only  be  developed  when 
circumstances are relatively unchanged over a significant period of time. 
In  addition,  dynamic  capabilities  are  concerned  with  changes  in  zero-order  capabilities  and 
their constituent routines.  If dynamic capabilities are per definition about changes in lower-order 
capabilities  and constituent routines,  and  if routines  and capabilities cannot change radically  in 
short  periods  of  time,  then  the  logical  conclusion  seems  that  dynamic  capabilities  cannot 
enable radical,  short-term  change.  They will therefore  not be valuable under circumstances of 
fast-paced,  radical  change.  So,  according  to  existing  literature,  dynamic  capabilities  are 
not valuable under circumstances of fast-paced, radical change. 
However,  some  empirical  research  findings  contradict  the  proposition  that  dynamic 
capabilities  can  only  be  built  and  are  only  valuable  under  long  periods  of  moderate 
change. The study that maybe most explicitly opposes to this proposition,  is by Eisenhardt and 
Martin  (2000).  They  explicitly  discern  between  dynamic  capabilities  for  moderately  dynamiC 
markets  and  for  high-velocity  markets.  Moderately  dynamic  markets  are  characterized  by 
frequent,  but  roughly  predictable  and  linearly  evolving  changes,  a relatively  stable  industry 
structure, clear market boundaries, and well-known players.  High-velocity markets demonstrate 
highly  unpredictable,  non-linear  changes,  unclear  industry  structure,  blurred  market 
boundaries,  ambiguity about and  shifts  in relevant players.  Sustained competitive advantage is 
considered  unlikely  in  dynamic  markets  (D'Aveni,  1994).  Similarly,  Eisenhardt  and  Martin  do 
not believe in the possibility of leveraging existing resource configurations in the pursuit of long-
term  competitive  advantage  in  high-velocity  markets.  Under  the  resource-based  view  of 
dynamic  capabilities  as  the  ability  to  leverage  competences  to  address  rapidly  changing 
environments,  this  is  the  same  as  saying  that  they  do  not  believe  in  the  value  of  dynamic 
capabilities  in  high-velocity  markets.  However,  Eisenhardt  and  Martin  do  not  adhere  to  this 
traditional definition of dynamic capabilities.  Instead, they propose that the  strategic imperative 
under  high-velocity markets  is  change,  and  not  leverage.  Instead  of enhancing/leveraging the 
existing  resource  configurations  in  the  pursuit  of  long-term  competitive  advantage,  an 
40 organization  in  high-velocity markets should  build  new resource configurations  in  the pursuit of 
temporary advantages or opportunities, thus creating a series of temporary advantages. 
Referring  to  well  studied  processes  such  as  product  development,  alliance-formation  and 
strategic  decision  making,  the  authors  point  out  that  this  broader  definition  of  dynamic 
capabilities calls for a richer conception of routines that goes beyond the usual view of efficient 
and  robust processes to  include these  more fragile,  semi-structured  ones that  are  effective  in 
high-velocity  markets.  In  moderately  dynamic  markets,  dynamic capabilities  are  described  as 
analytic,  stable  processes,  relying  extensively  on  existing  knowledge,  'learning  before  doing', 
and  linear  execution  (beginning  with  analysis  and  ending  with  implementation)  to  produce 
predictable  outcomes.  They  resemble  the traditional  conception  of 'routines'  (i.e.  complicated, 
predictable, analytic, relying on existing knowledge,  linear, slowly evolving over time).  However, 
for high-velocity markets, the authors describe dynamic capabilities as simple,  semi-structured, 
experiential  processes,  relying  on  'learning  by  doing',  rapidly  created  situation-specific  new 
knowledge  and  iterative execution  to  produce  adaptive,  but unpredictable outcomes.  Dynamic 
capabilities in  high-velocity markets are difficult to sustain because they rely on  simple routines 
that  are  easy  to  forget.  In  high-velocity  environments,  effective  routines  are  adaptive  to 
changing circumstances.  The price of that adaptability is unstable processes with unpredictable 
outcomes. 
Similarly,  Eisenhardt and Martin propose that the learning mechanisms guiding the evolution of 
dynamic  capabilities  differ  depending  on  market  dynamism.  In  mOderately  dynamic  markets, 
the  organization  builds  up  experience  in  closely  related  but  different  situations.  This  kind  of 
experience  - with  frequent,  small  variations  - will  be  effective  in  sharpening  dynamic 
capabilities.  In  high-velocity markets,  the  selection  of relevant  past experience  becomes  more 
important  than  variation.  Selection  is  difficult  because  it  is  challenging  to  figure  out  which 
experience  should  be  generalized  from  the  extensive  situation-specific  knowledge that occurs 
(see also the schools-of-experience view;  Christensen and  Raynor, 2003; McCall, 1998). 
Not  everyone  supports  the  hypothesis  of  Eisenhardt  and  Martin  to  broaden  the  traditional 
definition  of  routines  and  dynamic  capabilities  in  order to  encompass  the  more  fragile,  semi-
structured  ones  they  discuss  in  their  study.  Winter  (2003)  for  example,  simply  categorizes 
these experiential, fragile,  semi-structured activities as 'ad hoc problem solving'.  In  his view,  ad 
hoc  problem  solving  may  be  patterned  at  a higher  level,  guided  by  adherence  to  relatively 
41 simple rules and structural principles; and  he considers the activities put forward  by Eisenhardt 
and  Martin  as  examples thereof.  Many researchers  are  still very skeptical  about the  existence 
of dynamic  capabilities  for  high-uncertainty/high-velocity  environments.  They  believe  success 
under  these  conditions  simply  depends  on  luck,  leadership,  culture  and  good  management 
practice or ad  hoc problem solving. We might ask ourselves whether ad  hoc problem solving  in 
itself is  not a dynamic capability in  high-velocity environments. Although specific solutions may 
differ  across  problems  and  over  time,  understanding  and  organizing  for  these  frequent 
problems may require certain routines and capabilities. 
Entrepreneurial adaptation: a dynamic capability? 
We defined 'entrepreneurial adaptation' as the entrepreneur's willingness and ability to make 
appropriate adjustments to the business model as the venture evolves from an initial idea or 
business plan through the early stages of the organizational life-cycle (cfr. Morris et aI.,  1999; 
Pitt and Kannemeyer,  2000). According to  Druilhe and Garnseyj2004) opportunity detection 
and mobilization, combination and organization of resources are critical parts of this adaptation 
process.  In their view "entrepreneurial projects progress through the continual interaction 
between shifting opportunities and emerging combinations of  resources" (Druilhe and Garnsey, 
2004,  p.  273). They find that the interaction between opportunities and resources is iterative, 
non-linear, and bi-directional. On the one hand, the type of business opportunity selected in the 
initial business model influences the resource requirements, on the other hand, improved 
knowledge of resources and opportunities will allow entrepreneurs to adapt and modify their 
business model. Similar to Druilhe and Garnsey (2004), Vohora et al.  (2004) find that "the 
entrepreneurial teams faced the challenges of  continuously identifying, acquiring and 
integrating resources and then subsequently re-configuring them. " 
These  findings  of  Druilhe  and  Garnsey  (2004)  and  Vohora  et  al.  (2004)  characterize 
entrepreneurial adaptation  as a continuous change process and  show remarkable similarities 
to  the  description  of  dynamic  capabilities  as  put  forward  by  T  eece  et  al.  (1997)  as  being 
about continuously integrating, building  and reconfiguring  internal and external competences to 
address  rapidly  changing  environments;  with  competences  signifying  organizational  routines 
and  processes.  However,  whereas  in  general  the  literature  on  dynamic  capabilities  regards 
adaptation  as  an  organization's  response  to  changes  in  the  environment,  'entrepreneurial 
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ventures who  need  to find their place  in the environment,  or even  about them  finding the  most 
appropriate environment. 
Although  entrepreneurial  adaptation  shows  remarkable  similarities  to  the  concept  of dynamic 
capabilities  in  established  organizations, there  are issues that need further investigation  in this 
respect. According to existing research, entrepreneurial adaptation can  lead to gradual as well 
as  radical  change.  Van  de  Ven  et  al.  (1999)  show that the development process of an  initial 
idea  into  a viable  business  model  is  characterized  by  converging  and  diverging  phases,  in 
which  the  entrepreneurial  team  respectively  elaborates/confirmslrefines a certain  opportunity, 
or  completely  changes  course  by  radically  altering  the  business  model.  The  possibility  of 
radical  and  at the  same time  continuous change  goes  against the traditional view on  dynamic 
capabilities.  However,  it would  correspond  to  the  findings  of Eisenhardt and  Martin  (2000)  on 
the existence of dynamic capabilities in high-velocity markets. 
SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this paper,  we  have tried to  give  an  overview of insights that are relevant to entrepreneurial 
adaptation.  These  insights  all  relate  to  the  questions  (1)  What  causes  the  need  for 
entrepreneurial  adaptation?  (2a)  What  is  the  precise  effect of entrepreneurial  adaptation  on  a 
start-up's performance or survival and  (2b)  is this effect similar for all  start-ups? Also,  (3)  what 
do  we  know  about  the  process  of  entrepreneurial  adaptation?  And  (4)  what  are  factors 
enabling this adaptation process? A number of relevant insights have already been validated in 
existing  research.  With  regard  to  question  (1),  various  studies  demonstrate  that  the  need  for 
entrepreneurial adaptation is caused by the presence of uncertainty and ambiguity.  Liabilities of 
newness, smallness and foreignness hinder new ventures to cope with problems, including with 
this presence of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Other  suggestions  from  literature  on  entrepreneurship,  on  adaptation  in  established 
organizations  and  on  innovation  management,  appear  relevant,  but  need  empirical  testing  in 
the context of entrepreneurial adaptation. With regard to question  (2a), literature on established 
firms points to the danger of not only 'under-adaptation',  but also 'over-adaptation', implying  an 
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not yet been investigated for a sample of young, entrepreneurial companies,  it deserves further 
research  attention.  Besides,  the  entrepreneurship  literature  suggests  that  this  relationship 
between  entrepreneurial  adaptation  and  performance  may  be  moderated  by  characteristics of 
the start-up such  as the former experience of the founder(s)  and  whether the company  has  its 
origin  in  an  established company or research organization.  Sector studies point to the possible 
moderating  effect of  maturity,  capital  intensity  and  regime  of technological  opportunity  on  the 
relationship  between  adaptation  and  performance.  So,  with  regard  to  question  (2b),  we  can 
conclude  that  new  research  on  the  relationship  between  entrepreneurial  adaptation  and 
performance  needs  to  take  into  account  these  possibly  moderating  company  and  sector 
characteristics. 
In  order to  gain  more  insight  in  the  entrepreneurial  adaptation  process  itself  (question  3)  we 
reviewed  various  literature  streams,  including  life-cycle  models  and  literature  on  innovation 
management.  The  model  by  Van  de  Ven  et  al  (1999)  is  an  interesting  representation  of the 
innovation  process.  It is based  on  detailed empirical observations and  describes innovation  as 
a  cyclical  process  consisting  of  two  alternating  episodes  of  respectively  divergent  and 
convergent  behavior.  This  cyclicality  relates  to  and  confirms  the  bi-directionality  and  non-
linearity  described  in  recent  life-cycle  models.  However,  in  the  context  of  new  ventures,  we 
might ask ourselves if uncertainty and  ambiguity should  not be  given a more  prominent role  in 
this  model.  This  would  relate  to  other  findings  in  new  product  development  literature  that 
management  should  be  made  contingent  on  the  degree  of uncertainty/ambiguity  inherent  in 
these  projects  (and  not  on  the  complexity  as  suggested  by  Van  de  Ven  et  aI.,  1999).  In 
addition, the model  in two phases with two learning mechanism  by Van de Ven  et al. should  be 
reviewed  in  detail,  given  the  fact that  others  have  proposed  more  than  two  types/degrees  of 
uncertainty/ambiguity  (De  Meyer  et  aI.,  2002)  and  the  existence  of  multiple  management 
approaches (Pich et aI.,  2002). Therefore,  more research  is needed to iteratively test the model 
by Van  de  Ven  et al.  (1999)  and  additional  insights  on the  role  of uncertainty/ambiguity drawn 
form new product development literature. 
When  reviewing  the  literature  on  adaptation  in  entrepreneurial  companies,  we  also  find  that 
much  work  still  needs  to  be  done  to  determine  which  factors  enable  a venture  to  adapt  its 
business  model  (question  4).  Literature  on  adaptation  in  established  organizations  suggests 
that adaptation  is related  to slack and  inefficiency in  resources  used,  but to our knowledge,  no 
44 one  has  studied  this  effect  in  the  context  of  entrepreneurial  start-ups.  This  is  particularly 
surprising  given  the  difficulties  new  ventures  often  have  in  acquiring  resources  (see  our 
discussion  of  liabilities  of  smallness,  newness  and  foreignness).  We  therefore  conclude  that 
more research  is  needed to  investigate the effect of resource availability (and  substitutes such 
as alliances)  on  entrepreneurial  adaptation.  Furthermore,  some organizational studies propose 
that  initial  resource  endowments  have  lasting  effects  on  performance,  while  others  attribute 
more importance to  continuously developed resources.  Therefore,  when  researching the effect 
of resource  availability  and  alliances  on  entrepreneurial  adaptation,  we  need  to  look  at  initial 
resource endowments as well as resources acquired later on. 
By  investigating  these  questions  more  in-depth,  we  may  also  learn  more  about  (5)  how  the 
concept of entrepreneurial adaptation  is related  to  existing concepts of change and  adaptation. 
More  precisely,  we  will  be  able  to  investigate  whether  the  adaptation  process  consists  of 
underlying  routines,  whether  it  is  governed  solely  by  'ad  hoc  problem  solving',  or  whether 
maybe  'ad  hoc  problem  solving'  itself  is  a  kind  of  routine  or  capability  in  high-velocity 
environments.  Research  on  the  adaptation  process  and  its  enabling  factors  will  also  reveal 
whether  entrepreneurial  adaptation  is  really  an  organizational  capability  or  a personal  skill  of 
the  entrepreneur.  These  insights will  provide  us  with  new insights  in  the  existence  and  role  of 
dynamic capabilities  in young organizations active  in  high-velocity environments. They will also 
allow us to validate or refine the definition and the anatomy of dynamic capabilities. 
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Conception and development 
• Develop the business idea 
• Develop product and market (through prototype) 
• Find financial resources 
Fluid stage 
• Develop customized products 
• Product innovations 
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Begin commercialization 
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• Maximization of sales 
• Process innovations 
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Existence 
• Deliver the product or service  Churchill and  Lewis 
(1983)  • Expand from  key customer to broader sales base 
Clarysse and Moray 
(2004) 










• Validate opportunity 
• Write business plan 
• Find financial 
resources 
• Recruit team 
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Figure 1: Overview of the major literature streams on start-up phase 
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Figure  2:  Cyclical model by Druilhe and Garnsey (2004) 
Constraining factors 
External rules and mandates 
Internal focus and self-orqanizinq 
Divergent Behavior 
•  Branching and expanding 
process of exploring new 
directions 
•  Creating ideas and strategy 
•  Learning by discovery; 
exploratory search 
•  Pluralistic leadership 
•  Building relationships and 
porous networks 
•  Creating infrasdtructure for 
collective advantage 
Convergent Behavior 
•  Integrating an narrowing 
process of exploiting a given 
direction 
•  Implementing ideas and 
strategy 









Executing relationships in 
established networks 
Operating within infrastructure 
for competitive advantage 
Figure 3:  Cyclical model by Van de Ven et al.  (1999) 
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